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ARTICLES

Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care
Allison K. Hoffman*

Abstract:
U.S. law and policy on long-term care fail to address the insecurity
American families face due to prolonged illness and disability—a problem that
grows more serious as the population ages and rates of disability rise. This
Article argues that, even worse, we have focused on only part of the problem. It
illuminates two ways that prolonged disability or illness can create insecurity.
The first arises from the risk of becoming disabled or sick and needing long-term
care, which could be called “care-recipient” risk. The second arises out of the
risk of becoming responsible for someone else’s care, which I call “next-friend”
risk. The law and social welfare policy has focused on the first, but this Article
argues that the second equally threatens the wellbeing of American families.
While attempting to mitigate care-recipient risk, in fact, the law has steadily
expanded next-friend risk, by reinforcing a structure of long-term care that relies
heavily on informal caregiving. Millions of informal caregivers face financial
and nonmonetary harms that deeply threaten their own long-term security. These
harms are disproportionately experienced by people who are already
vulnerable—women, minorities, and the poor. Scholars and policymakers have
catalogued and critiqued these costs but treat them as an unfortunate byproduct of
an inevitable system of informal care.
This Article argues that if we, instead, understand becoming responsible for
the care of another as a social risk—just as we see the chance that a person will
need long-term care as a risk—it could fundamentally shift the way we approach
long-term care policy. In risk-theory terms, this Article proposes we reimagine
the risk of long-term care.

* Thank you to my excellent edit team at YJHPLE and to Alex Boni-Saenz, Sam Bray, Ann
Carlson, Scott Cummings, Ingrid Eagly, Jill Horwitz, Robert Hughes, Sung-Hui Kim, Dani
Kaiserman, Russell Korobkin, Gillian Lester, Timothy Malloy, Jon Michaels, Eric Miller, Jennifer
Mnookin, Steve Munzer, Jason Oh, Jessica Roberts, Vicki Schultz, Dan Schwarcz, Joanna
Schwartz, Seana Shiffrin, Kathy Stone, Rebecca Stone, Seth Weisbord, Noah Zatz, and Eriz Zolt
and the participants at Harvard Law School’s Petrie-Flom Center Workshop, the Southern
California Junior Faculty Scholarship Workshop, the Emerging Family Law Scholars and Teachers
Workshop, and faculty workshops at UCLA, Berkeley, Boston University, Irvine, Loyola, Penn,
and Southwestern Law Schools for valuable comments on various drafts of this project. For
research assistance, I am grateful to Scott Chandler, Erynn Embree, Billy Herbert, Kenneth
Kennedy, Doug Merkel, Eli Tomar and especially research librarian extraordinaire Lynn
McClelland. This article is dedicated to Elliot, whom I hope will never be obligated to care for his
parents, and to some of the most admirable next friends I know—Bonnie and Les, Michael and
Muffy, Lizzie, Brent, Zannah, and Lilly, and Larry and Dianne.
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!
INTRODUCTION
Americans’ need for long-term care poses a daunting public policy
challenge.1 The actual demand for care has grown as the rates of disability
increase, as modern medicine saves people who previously would not have
survived, and as the number of “old old” Americans grows.2 An underlying
panic about the impending long-term care crisis bubbles up regularly in the
news.3 Private efforts to address it have fallen short. Even the social insurance
program for long-term care that Ted Kennedy ushered through as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),4 called the CLASS Act,5
collapsed.6 Congress then tasked a Long-Term Care Commission to generate a
new solution, and the Commission failed to reach consensus.7 Long-term care
policy is in limbo.
Policymakers and scholars who have wrestled with social policy for
long-term care primarily consider the problem from the perspective of the ten
million Americans who need such care—in other words from the perspective
of care-recipient risk. Yet the need for long-term care undermines the security
of American families in reverberating ways.

1

Long-term care—sometimes called “long-term services and supports”— refers to assistance
for someone with chronic illness or disability who faces physical or cognitive limitations. The
law defines this care in terms of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities
of Daily Living (IADLs). ADLs include personal care, such as bathing, dressing, getting in and
out of bed, mobility, eating, and toileting. IADLs include more complex functions, including
managing finances, managing medication, and shopping. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF
DISABILITY IN AMERICA 50 (2007) [hereinafter IOM, FUTURE OF DISABILITY]. This Article’s
discussion of long-term care refers to assistance with ADLs and IADLs, not to home health care
or
medical care (although, as discussed herein, the lines blur at times).
2
See Section II.B for discussion of other factors that have increased the need for long-term
care.
“Old old” generally refers to people over 80 years old.
3
See, e.g., Jason Kane, 6 Tips for Averting America’s Looming Long-Term Care Crisis, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Nov. 6, 2013); Bob Kerrey, Long-Term Solutions… ,..for Long-Term Care, CHI.
TRIBUNE
(Nov.
21,
2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-1121/news/0811200685_1_quality-long-term-care-providers-health-care; Penelope Wang, The
Retirement Crisis Nobody Talks About: Long Term Care, TIME (June 20, 2014),
http://time.com/money/2901647/the-retirement-crisis-nobody-talks-about-long-term-care; John
F. Wasik, Long-Term Care Insurance Can Baffle, With Complex Policies and Costs, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/your-money/long-term-careinsurance-can-baffle-with-complex-policies-and-costs.html.
4
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat.
1029.
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 8002(a) 124 Stat.
119,
828-41 (creating Title XXXII of the Public Health and Safety Act).
6
The Obama Administration put the program on hold and Congress repealed it because they
said it was actuarially unsound. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §
642,
126 Stat. 2313, 2358 (2013).
7
Examining the Finance and Delivery of Long-Term Care in the US: Hearing Before
Subcomm. On Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony
of Alice M. Rivlin, Co-Chair, Long-Term Care Initiative, Bi-Partisan Policy Center).
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This Article argues that the full insecurity of long-term care becomes
clear only when we look at the problem also from the perspective of the
family and friends who are responsible for providing this care. These informal
caregivers are experiencing what this Article proposes we think of as “nextfriend” risk.8
The early to mid-twentieth century marked a period of decreased reliance
on family for long-term care, as social insurance infrastructure developed.
Local, state, and federal governments funded care in public institutions and
private nursing homes. Yet, late twentieth century law and policy, especially
with the creation and evolution of Medicaid, turned the tide back toward older
traditions of family caregiving and has resulted in a legal structure that
institutionalizes and intensifies caregiving burdens for American families.
Medicaid has become the locus of social insurance for long-term care,
financing sixty percent of all paid long-term care. 9 Because Medicaid
eligibility is means-tested, Americans must have almost no income or assets to
qualify. 10 That, plus the fact that few people have any private insurance
coverage for long-term care, means that most Americans have only two
choices: “spend down” their savings to become poor enough to qualify for
Medicaid or, more often, rely on family and friends.
Yet, even the people eligible for Medicaid increasingly rely on friends
and family for significant amounts of care. Over the past few decades,
Medicaid funding for long-term care has shifted from having a bias for care in
institutions to a bias for care in homes. Now, one-half of Medicaid long-term
care spending pays for home-based care.11
The conventional wisdom is that this trend is wholly positive.12 It has
decreased reliance on poor-quality institutional care, and it enables many
8

I borrow the phrase “next friend” from the legal term for a person in litigation who represents
someone with a disability who is otherwise unable to represent himself. In the context of longterm care, although not necessarily a legal guardian, the next friend protects the interests of
another, by providing care directly or arranging it. I use this term instead of “informal
caregiver” or “family caregiver” to emphasize that the next friend might not provide care
personally (instead helping to outsource it) and is sometimes, although less frequently, a nonrelative.
9
Carol V. O’Shaughnessy, National Spending for Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS),
2012, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM 3 (2014), https://www.nhpf.org/library/thebasics/Basics_LTSS_03-27-14.pdf (excluding Medicare post-acute care). Medicaid, while it
might have once been arguably an entitlement program, has over time increasingly resembled a
social insurance program, spreading health spending risk across a growing population of
beneficiaries, especially when considering long-term care since the program is universal for
anyone
who depletes assets to qualify, as discussed infra note 70.
10
See infra note 70 (describing Medicaid’s eligibility rules).
11
Steve Eiken et al., Medicaid Expenditures for Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS) in FY
2013: Home and Community-Based Services Were a Majority of LTSS Spending, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 3 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-programinformation/by-topics/long-term-services-and-supports/downloads/ltss-expenditures-fy2013.pdf
(documenting that home and community-based services accounted for 51.3% of total Medicaid
spending
on long-term services and supports in 2013).
12
See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care:
Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 937-38, 967-68 (2010)
(describing this trend and the benefits of increased home-based care).
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people with serious illness or disability to live at home as independently as
possible. On the other hand, Medicaid’s evolving approach amplifies burdens
for beneficiaries’ family and friends.
Medicaid programs for home-based care are underfunded and have long
waiting lists and gaps. These programs often limit personal care services and
the other non-medical aspects of caregiving that have long been neglected in
social welfare programs. Family and friends fill these gaps—gaps that were
not as acute in the era of institutional care. At the end of the twentieth century,
the law has thus re-inscribed long-term care as a private obligation.
Yet long-term care as a private obligation is increasingly untenable. The
actual care needs of people with chronic illness and disability are becoming
more intensive. 13 At the same time, families and friends are less able to
address these needs. The breadwinner family structure, where the husband
earned wages and the wife took care of the home and family, has eroded.
Single-parent families and two wage-earner households are the new normal,
leaving little cushion to absorb caregiving. 14 Families have dispersed
geographically. 15 And the ratio of people needing care to those who can
provide it is increasing as people live longer and have fewer kids.16
As a result of increased obligations combined with the changing shape of
families, informal caregivers, who are disproportionately women, face
staggering burdens.17 By one estimate, the financial losses alone—including
forgone income, pensions, benefits, and retirement savings—sustained by the
average informal caregiver who leaves the workforce to care for a parent are
$300,000. 18 These monetary losses are just the beginning. Many informal
caregivers experience permanent harm to their health, relationships, and
general wellbeing.19
What if instead of designating these costs as a private obligation, we
considered them as a collective problem—the manifestation of a social risk?
13
14

See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2012, 840 tbl. 1337 (2012)
(documenting the rise in single-parent households); Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force
Participation: 75 Years of Change, 1950-98 and 1998-2025, 1999 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 tbl.
1 (documenting the past and projected increasing participation of women in the U.S. labor
force).
15
See Ping Ren, U.S. Census Bureau, Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
B
UREAU 1, 3 (2011) (“The U.S. population is characterized by high mobility.”).
16
See Emily Brandon, 65-and-Older Population Soars, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:15 AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/01/09/65-and-older-population-soars
(reporting that the proportion of Americans 65 and older has grown from 4.1% in 1900 to 13%
in
2012).
17
See
infra Section II.C.
18
METLIFE MATURE MARKET INST., THE METLIFE STUDY OF CAREGIVING COSTS TO WORKING
CAREGIVERS: DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR BABY BOOMERS CARING FOR THEIR PARENTS 15 (2011)
[hereinafter
METLIFE,
DOUBLE
JEOPARDY],
https://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2011/Caregiving-Costs-toWorking-Caregivers.pdf. Another recent study models the median opportunity costs of two
years of caregiving for a sick mother to be $164,726. Meghan M. Skira, Dynamic Wage and
Employment Effects of Elder Parent Care, 56 INT’L ECON. REV. 63, 82 (2015). Since the
average duration of caregiving is twice as long, see infra note 182 and accompanying text, the
average
caregiver would face opportunity costs twice this amount.
19
METLIFE, supra note 18, at 15.
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While caregiving might have been excluded from the American vision of
social insurance at its nascence, when it was perceived as not posing a threat
to the security of the breadwinner family, long-term care is clearly a serious
threat to the security of American families now and should be recognized as
such.
This Article offers a new possibility: considering the burdens of
caregiving, at least with respect to long-term care, as a serious social risk—
one equal to the risk of needing long-term care. This perspective could offer
insights for two areas of legal scholarship. First, a considerable body of
health, elder, and disability law and policy scholarship addresses long-term
care as a social insurance problem, but it assumes the primary insurable risk is
care-recipient risk.20 Implicit in this work is, in most cases, the inevitability of
continued, substantial reliance on informal caregiving—a position this Article
questions. In contrast, a rich body of feminist legal scholarship demands
greater state support for caregiving, mostly with regard to childcare but to
some extent also long-term care, based on ideas that caregiving is a public
responsibility or a public good.21 Seeing the burdens next friends face as a
social risk provides another justification for enhanced state support, and, even
more importantly, reframing the costs caregivers face in the language of risk
justifies social insurance to address these costs.22
The language of risk is powerful. How a society understands risk
strongly shapes perceptions of the proper role of the state.23 Every creation or
expansion of social insurance in the United States required reimagining
something that had previously been thought of as a private cost or obligation
instead as a social risk—a threat to American families’ security—in order to
motivate a collective solution.24
20
21
22

See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-126.
Anne Alstott’s “life-planning insurance” is a form of social insurance for parents of children
with disabilities. ANNE ALSTOTT, NO EXIT 117-37 (2004). She justifies her proposal based on
public responsibility owed to these parents in return for their heightened caregiving obligation.
This Article could support a similar intervention but based on a different rationale—the
existence of a widely shared social risk. This rationale suggests the need for a social insurance
solution available to any friend or family member who takes on the responsibility of another’s
long-term
care, not just to parents.
23
The language of risk is increasingly used to evoke an individual’s responsibility to reduce
risk though responsible choices, but historically it described problems that warranted a
collective solution. See, e.g., JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006) (describing what he
calls the “personal responsibility crusade” and how it has created insecurity for American
families by undermining social insurance policies); Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing
Risk, in EMBRACING RISK (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing both an
increased recognition of social problems in terms of risk and a reactionary trend against
spreading risk); Martha McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and Redistribution of Social Insurance, in
EMBRACING RISK, supra, at 146 (describing a shift in the United States from concern with the
risk faced by workers to that faced by employers and big business); Jonathan Simon, Risk and
Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Add to the Study of Risk and the Law, 57 ALA. L. REV.
119 (2005) (describing the evolution of the risks that most concern Americans and changing
beliefs
on how best to manage risk).
24
Examples of scholarship that describe how an understanding of risk has motivated state
action to ameliorate it include MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER
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The costs and obligations next friends shoulder look very similar to other
insurable risks. Responsibility for the long-term care of another is unplanned
and often unavoidable. The level of harm is stochastic and unmanageable for
almost all Americans in the worst-case scenario involving years of intensive
care. This responsibility threatens Americans’ financial, emotional, and
physical wellbeing as much as other phenomena that have motivated
government response, including work injuries, unemployment, outliving one’s
savings, and medical spending in retirement. 25 Taking next-friend risk
seriously has at least four major implications for long-term care policies.
First, it redefines the scale of the problem of long-term care. Current
policy hides costs borne by next friends, in ways described in Part I below. In
2013, by one conservative estimate, informal caregivers provided $470 billion
worth of long-term care services to adults, if time spent caregiving were
valued at market caregiver wages.26 Accounting for replacement costs for just
these hours—only a part of the problem—would require additional funding of
triple Medicaid’s current spending on long-term care. Even if this level of
additional funding is unlikely, considering these costs as part of the problem
could at least anchor policymakers on a higher number and a more complete
view of the costs of long-term care, as discussed in Part II.
Second, understanding these costs as a manifestation of next-friend risk
implies that social insurance might be the best tool to address the problem.27
Part III makes the case for better social insurance protections against nextRELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013); MICHAEL A. GRAETZ &
JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE (1999);
THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA’S NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND
CONTESTED FUTURE (2014); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); Baker &
Simon, supra note 23; François Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An
Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution (Stephen Utz trans.), in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 23,
at 278-81; and Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and ‘Natural’ Disaster Relief:
Narrating
the American Welfare State, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 257, 271 (1999).
25
These programs are addressed by a mix of mandatory private insurance and social insurance,
but they share in common that social policy requires risk to be shared collectively, rather than
borne
privately.
26
Susan C. Reinhard et al., Valuing the Invaluable: 2015 Update, Undeniable Progress, but Big
Gaps Remain, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 3 (2015). Note that this estimate, based on eleven
surveys of family caregivers, only accounts for care recipients age 18 and older and uses an
hourly wage of $12.51. Other estimates are higher and lower. One study estimates opportunity
costs of $412 billion for informal elder caregivers under the age of 65 ($522 billion if also
including those over age 65). Amalavoyal V. Chari et al., The Opportunity Costs of Informal
Elder-Care in the United States: New Estimates from the American Time Use Survey, 50
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 871, 877 (2015). The same study estimates replacement costs ranging
from $221 to 642 billion, depending on whether skilled or unskilled labor is used ($7.25 per
hour
for the former estimate and $21 per hour for the latter). Id.
27
“Social insurance” is used to refer to government programs that spread risk, such as Medicare
or Social Security. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24. Because social insurance also
intentionally redistributes resources, some argue that it is actually a tax-and-transfer program
and not like “real” (meaning private) insurance. See James Kwak, “Social Insurance,” Risk
Spreading, and Redistribution, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE
LAW 127 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). This view, however, fails to
recognize that all insurance, private and public, is redistributive from low-risk to high-risk
people and from the lucky to the unlucky. Pricing can attempt to limit this redistribution or to
counterbalance regressivity that ensues, but regardless of the extent, redistribution is a defining
feature of all insurance.
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friend risk and considers conceptually what it would require to create such
protections. This Part examines where next-friend risk begins and ends and for
whom.
Third, whether with additional funding or not, policies could be designed
to better mitigate next-friend risk, as discussed in Part IV. There are two ways
that a next friend could, in theory, respond to another’s need for care: provide
it personally or pay for care. If she could toggle more freely between these
two choices—provide or pay—she could determine how to use benefits
simultaneously to minimize her own harm and to meet the needs of the person
who needs long-term care. Current policy is focused so narrowly on carerecipient risk that it does not even see the need for this toggle and often
prevents it.
Fourth, recognizing next-friend risk forces the admittedly uncomfortable
question of whether social policy must better balance the needs of care
recipients and next friends.
It is not easy to conceive of a solution to the long-term care problem
when seen from both the care-recipient and next-friend perspectives, because
of its sheer magnitude and complexity. But turning a blind eye to the costs
borne by next friends by hiding these costs in homes across the country is not
a sustainable solution. Any social insurance policy for long-term care—
whether comprehensive or not—must at least grapple with the reverberating
ways that long-term care needs undermine Americans’ security; otherwise,
policies will, in the process of creating security for some, bolster social
structures that undermine security for others.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF LONG-TERM CARE LAW AND POLICY FROM THE
CARE-RECIPIENT PERSPECTIVE

The existence of insurance for long-term care is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Before the twentieth century, long-term care was the
responsibility of family or community.28 This notion of familial responsibility,
however, has been an ambivalent one in the United States since at least the
mid-nineteenth century, when a “society defined by mobility and free labor”
weakened presumptions of family obligation. 29 As a result, other forms of
providing and paying for long-term care slowly began to emerge.
Long-term care insurance—both private and social—has had mixed
results. Private long-term care insurance has largely failed and, experts agree,
would be challenging to revive.30 Social insurance has evolved and expanded
28

See David Barton Smith & Zhanlian Feng, The Accumulated Challenges of Long-Term Care,
29
HEALTH AFF. 29, 29 (2010).
29
HENDRICK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND
O
LD AGE 29 (2012).
30
See Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, Insuring Long-Term Care in the U.S., 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 119, 129-31 (2011).
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but is still piecemeal and partial. 31 Despite limited reach, both private and
social long-term care insurance work, in theory, to cushion the harms people
suffer when they face chronic illness or physical or mental disability. In other
words, both aim to mitigate care-recipient risk. Policies can pay for variable
amounts of help with personal care, such as bathing, dressing, getting in and
out of bed, eating, and using the toilet—collectively referred to as the
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs)—and also with more complex functions,
such as managing finances, household chores, medication, and shopping—
collectively, Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs).32
This Part describes the emergence of long-term care insurance and how,
in the end, Medicaid became the primary locus of public long-term care
funding. It illustrates how the development of Medicaid policy from the carerecipient perspective has provided greater security for some people with
disabilities and illness, but, at the same time, has increased and cemented
reliance on friends and family to meet care-recipients’ long-term care needs.
A. The Failure of Private Insurance for Long-Term Care
Private insurance struggles under classic conditions of market failure.33
Only seven to nine million Americans in 2010 held private long-term care
insurance policies.34 Experts attribute the low penetration rate of private longterm care insurance to both perception and prices. Research shows that people
undervalue the purchase of long-term care insurance due to poor information
or cognitive biases that cause them to underestimate their future long-term
care needs.35 This undervaluation is compounded by the high price of policies,
caused in part by pervasive adverse selection (i.e., people who buy policies
are more likely to use them).36
Even without such problems, many people would still forgo private
coverage. For low- and middle-income people, who might become eligible for
Medicaid, its existence as a safety net crowds out private coverage. 37 For
31

See generally EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE (2012) (describing the evolution of the
government’s
role in paying for caregiving).
32
IOM, FUTURE OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 50. I discuss below in Section II.E. why
mitigating care-recipient risk does not necessarily mean simultaneously mitigating risk for next
friends, based on both the comprehensiveness and the particular design of long-term care
insurance.
33
See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 129.
34
See Kathleen Ujvari, Long-Term Care Insurance: 2012 Update, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 1
(2012),
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/ltc/2012/ltcinsurance-2012-update-AARP-ppi-ltc.pdf.
35
See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 131; Jeffrey R. Brown, et al., Long-Term Care
Insurance Demand Limited by Beliefs About Needs, Concerns About Insurers, and Care
Available
from Family, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1294, 1300 (2012).
36
See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30, at 126-28; Mark J. Browne, Adverse Selection in the
Long-Term Care Insurance Market, in INSURANCE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 97 (Pierre-André Chiappori & Christian Gollier eds., 2006); Emily Oster et al.,
Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease,
94 J. PUB. ECON. 1041 (2010) (showing selection among people with Huntington Disease into
long-term
care insurance markets).
37
See Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance:
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those unlikely to qualify for Medicaid, the decision not to buy long-term care
insurance might be a way for aging parents to ensure family members will
care for them personally, in their homes, rather than use policy benefits to put
them in a nursing home.38 Since private insurance generally does not pay for
family care, having private insurance is less appealing to people who prefer
that a family member or close friend provide care.39
Because of these problems, the current private market is unraveling.
Premium rates are unstable and for some policies the benefits are not
guaranteed or inflation protected.40 Even in the best case, benefits are typically
insufficient to pay for all necessary care, especially for someone who wants to
receive care at home.41 One expert notes that “the prospective insured must
have access to a dependable network of family, friends, and others to
supplement the [paid] home care provider if she expects to use the policy’s
benefits for home care.”42
In light of these challenges, many major insurers are terminating their
business in long-term care.43 Several attempts to revive the market, through
tax incentives and programs that offer people who purchase private policies
Medicaid eligibility with greater asset protection, have had little effect. 44
There may be ways to reverse this trend, 45 but to the extent the private
insurance market continues to struggle, social insurance offers the only viable
option for long-term care insurance for most Americans.
B. The Evolution and Limits of Social Insurance for Long-Term Care
Long-term care has not fit easily into the particular American vision of
social insurance either and, as a result, social insurance policies to address
long-term care needs have been incremental and incomplete. President
Theodore Roosevelt described the goal of social insurance as protection
against the “hazzards [sic] of sickness, accident, invalidism, involuntary

Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1092-93
(2008).
38
Mark V. Pauly, The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term-Care Insurance, 98 J. POL. ECON.
153,
163 (1990).
39
Corina Mommaerts, Long-Term Care Insurance and the Family (Nov. 11, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with author) (showing that informal care by family members weakens
demand
for long-term care insurance).
40
Insurers are prohibited from raising rates for individual policyholders, but they can and have
raised rates for an entire class of policies, doubling or even tripling premiums and causing
policyholders to drop coverage. See Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap:
Funding
Long-Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 440 (2007).
41
Id. at 432.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 442.
44
Id. at 443-48. Because any assets in excess of insurance benefits must be depleted and the
home equity limits still apply, this program really only targets those just above Medicaid
thresholds.
Id.
45
See Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 30; Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 37.
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unemployment and old age.”46 These hazards shared the common feature of
threatening the family wage due to a breadwinner’s inability to work.47 The
role of social insurance, in turn, was to replace lost wages. Long term-care
was not seen as a threat to the family wage. Non-medical caregiving was
perceived as being absorbed seamlessly into a breadwinner household
structure by the non-wage-earning wife.48 Even medical care was relatively
inexpensive and often ineffective at the time when social insurance first
emerged.49 As a hybrid of medical care and caregiving, long-term care was a
low priority for early social policy efforts.
Over time, however, social policies took up long-term care, and Medicaid
eventually emerged as the locus for long-term care social insurance policy. To
be clear, a variety of other government programs address other needs of
people with chronic illness or disability by, for example, replacing a portion
(albeit small) of lost wages through disability insurance 50 or paying for
medical needs through medical insurance. These programs, while critically
important for people with disabilities and chronic illness, do not address or
account for their long-term care needs—the assistance that they require on a
daily basis.
This Section describes Medicaid’s emergence and evolution, how it has
attempted to address the needs of care recipients, and, in the process, how it
has reaffirmed and intensified obligations for their friends and family.
1.

The Emergence of Social Policy on Long-Term Care

In the early 1900s, long-term care was “the last holdover of the
Elizabethan poor-law approach.”51 The only public welfare for long-term care
was provided in poorhouses, which “amounted to incarceration for
destitution.”52 Most people remained reliant on family care.53
46

Theodore Roosevelt, Address Before the Convention of the National Progressive Party in
Chicago,
Illinois (Aug. 6, 1912) (transcript at http://www.ssa.gov/history/trspeech.html).
47
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 212. In the breadwinner family structure, the husband
earned the wages and the wife cared for the household and family. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLERHARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN
T
WENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (2001).
48
BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31; see also Andrew I. Batavia et al., Toward a National
Personal Assistance Program: The Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care for Persons
with Disabilities, 16 J. HEALTH, POL’Y & L. 523, 527 (1991) (describing traditional reliance on
a system of “informal support” provided by family members and close friends); Katherine C.
Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era: Domestic and International Comparison of
Enforcement Practices for Laws Requiring Adult Children To Support Indigent Parents, 20
ELDER L.J. 269, 272 (2012)(describing how filial support laws support this notion of family
caregiving). One early exception was the creation of public institutions for the care of the
“feebleminded” in the early 1900s. E. FULLER TORREY, AMERICAN PSYCHOSIS: HOW THE
F
EDERAL GOVERNMENT DESTROYED THE MENTAL ILLNESS SYSTEM 4 (2013).
49
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 383, 388 (1982).
50
Disability benefits, including Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income, and
Workers Compensation, together replace only 25% of lost income and are insufficient to pay
for
long-term care needs. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 84.
51
Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 27.
52
Id.; see Watson, supra note 12, at 940.
53
Even for family members in institutions, women were responsible for taking care of clothing,
bedding, and other necessities. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31, at 20.
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But over the course of the twentieth century, publicly funded support for
long-term care grew. Early efforts at the state and local levels funded the
creation of public hospitals, state mental asylums, and schools for the blind
and the deaf. 54 After the Great Depression, the federal government entered
into the fold with cash and in-kind assistance programs to support people with
disabilities. Federal efforts began in earnest with the Social Security Act of
1935, which included the Old-Age Assistance program (for poor elderly), Aid
to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children, which were all programs of cash
assistance.55
These programs ushered in a private nursing home industry. The federal
matching funds for institutional care could not be used for “an inmate of a
public institution,” including state mental asylums and almshouses. 56 The
availability of this restricted funding spurred the growth of new private
institutions that could accept the funds.57
Even as nursing home care expanded, home-based care continued with
the support of various local, state, and federal efforts including the Works
Progress Administration’s “Housekeeping Services.” 58 These programs
funded everything from nursing care to personal care and even housework and
childcare, in some cases, for ill or disabled mothers.59 The mid-century rise of
private medical insurance, however, began to undermine these home-based
care programs. Insurance required services that were medical in nature to be
performed by licensed providers, which relocated the medical aspects of
caregiving from homes to hospitals. The other care-intensive aspects were
carved out of medical insurance and left to underfunded state welfare
programs.60
Modeled on this medicalized framework, the 1960 amendments to the
Social Security Act, including the Kerr-Mills Act, were the precursor to
Medicaid and the beginning of more substantial public funding for long-term
care.61 These amendments expanded eligibility for benefits to the “medically
needy”—people who were living above state public assistance levels but
spending a large share of their income on medical care—and defined medical
assistance to include long-term care. 62 With an expanded population of
eligible beneficiaries and a continued bias toward funding long-term care in
54
55
56

See Watson, supra note 12, at 941.
Id. at 941-47; Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 31.
Watson, supra note 12, at 942; see Smith and Feng, supra note 28, at 31. The federal mental
health legislation in the 1940s similarly prohibited federal funds to be spent on people living in
state
mental health hospitals. TORREY, supra note 48, at 26.
57
Watson, supra note 12, at 944.
58
BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31, at 22.
59
Id. at 30.
60
Id. at 65.
61
Watson, supra note 12, at 946-48. The Kerr-Mills Act was officially titled the Medical
Assistance for the Aged. Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, §§ 601-04,
74 Stat. 924, 987-92.
62
Watson, supra note 12, at 948-50.
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private, licensed institutions, the Kerr-Mills Act increased the number of
private nursing homes tenfold and laid the conceptual and structural
foundation for Medicaid.63
2.

Medicaid and the Modern Era of Social Insurance

The establishment of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the
“deserving poor” in 1965 meant increasing social-insurance coverage of longterm care within the medicalized model. 64 Although neither program was
specifically focused on long-term care, Medicaid became the default social
insurance program responsible for it.
Despite the common misconception otherwise, Medicare funds long-term
care at best “tangentially,” such as post-acute care after hospitalization, but it
does not pay for support with activities of daily living in home settings.65 In
fact, Medicare was intentionally not tailored to the needs of chronically ill
elderly because the drafters envisioned it would eventually expand into a
universal program for all Americans.66 Long-term nursing care was excluded
from Medicare altogether because it was deemed more custodial than
medical. 67 One study found that even in cases with Medicare reimbursing
home health care, family caregivers still provided three-quarters of needed
care, including in half of cases, performing skilled nursing care, such as
monitoring blood pressure and symptoms, and providing counseling or
physical or speech therapy.68 In effect, Medicare is not intended to and does
not insure long-term care.
In contrast, Medicaid now finances over sixty percent of all paid longterm care services. 69 It is a cooperative program between the federal
63

See id. at 950-51.
Some would refer to Medicaid as a welfare program because it is means-tested, but because it
spreads the risk of medical costs among a large portion of the population, it can also be thought
of as a form of social insurance. See supra note 25.
65
Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An Overview, 19 HEALTH AFF. 40,
44 (2000). Medicare pays for “post-acute” care, including 90 days of hospital care and a portion
of another 100 days of care in a skilled nursing facility or nursing home following
hospitalization. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(i) (2012) (requiring hospitalization for at least three days
and transfer to the skilled-nursing facility within thirty days). Medicare also has a home-health
benefit that includes nursing care and rehabilitative services, such as speech or physical
therapy. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (covering skilled nursing care or rehabilitative services under a
plan established by a doctor and reviewed every 60 days). Nursing care is limited to less than 8
hours per day and 28 hours per week and must be provided by or under the supervision of a
registered professional nurse. Id.
66
See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 232-33.
67
Watson, supra note 12, at 956.
68
Carole Levine et al., “This Case is Closed”: Family Caregivers and the Termination of Home
Health Care Services for Stroke Patients, 84 MILBANK Q. 305, 315-16 (2006).
69
O’Shaughnessy, supra note 9, at 3 (excluding Medicare post-acute care). Individuals finance
22% out of pocket and private insurance finances 12%. Id. Other public programs, including the
Department of Veterans Affairs or Department of Housing and Urban Development funding for
supportive services and housing for elderly or disabled residents of HUD-assisted housing, only
64
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government and the states. Federal regulations dictate eligibility and benefits
parameters for the state-run Medicaid programs and have shaped the face of
long-term care provision in the United States.
Several aspects of Medicaid’s design have been particularly significant.
First, even though Medicaid is now the primary financier for paid long-term
care, it is available to only the poorest Americans with significant medical
need and low income and assets. 70 Covering this population served as a
release valve. By addressing the needs of the most vulnerable people,
Medicaid alleviated the urgency for a more comprehensive long-term care
solution. Most Americans, somewhere in the middle of poor enough to qualify
for Medicaid and wealthy enough to afford a private long-term care policy,
turn to family and friends to fill in the gap (so long as they are fortunate
enough to have someone to whom to turn).71
Second, in the model of the Kerr-Mills Act, Medicaid adopted a
medicalized approach. 72 It initially had an “institutional bias” favoring the
provision of long-term care in licensed nursing homes. 73 Care in nursing
homes and other licensed institutions was designated a mandatory Medicaid
benefit—one that states must cover to receive federal matching funds. 74 In
contrast, personal care in home settings (e.g., bathing, dressing, eating, light
housework, grocery shopping, etc.) was designated as an optional benefit—
states could receive matching funds for this type of care but did not need to
cover it.75 These rules had two implications. First, Medicaid’s benefit structure
financed $10 billion in long-term care in 2012. JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40718,
LONG-TERM CARE (LTC): FINANCING OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11-13 (2009). The
Older Americans Act (OAA) includes in-kind assistance for people living at home; its biggest,
called “meals on wheels,” provides meals to older people in home settings. Wendy Fox-Grage
& Kathleen Ujvari, The Older Americans Act, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 2 (2014) (reporting that
meals on wheels served approximately 2.5 million people in 2011). The total OAA budget was
only
$1.88 billion in fiscal year 2014. Id. at 3.
70
In most states an individual’s Medicaid eligibility is tied to eligibility for the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program, which provides means-tested cash assistance for disabled,
blind, or aged individuals. States may extend eligibility to others with higher incomes up to
300% of the federal poverty level. See JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33593,
MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR LONG-TERM CARE: ELIGIBILITY, ASSET TRANSFERS, AND ESTATE
RECOVERY 4-5 (2008). Some qualify, even if above these income thresholds, by showing high
medical bills that effectively deplete or “spend down” their income to eligibility levels. Id. at 4.
Beneficiaries must also meet low assets standards, which is in most states under $2000 for an
individual and under $3000 for a couple, excluding some assets, such as a car and some value
of a residence. Id. at 6-7.
71
Long-term care is not included in the typical private health insurance plan. Medigap plans
might pay for assistance with ADLs but only in some plans and with a low dollar limit. Kaplan,
supra note 40, at 421.
72
See Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 31.
73
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2004).
74
See STONE, supra note 69, at 7. States must also fund home health care for people who would
otherwise be eligible for nursing facility services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(D) (2012).
Medicaid also adopted the Kerr-Mills eligibility category of medically needy. Id. §
1396a(a)(10)(C). Since many medically needy spend down on long-term care, this policy
increased the numbers beneficiaries in need of nursing home care. See Watson, supra note 12,
at
955-56.
75
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24), 1396d(a)(22).
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created incentives for more long-term care in nursing homes. Second, as
Medicaid’s institutional bias receded in favor of home-based care, as
described below, states’ programs did not cover all of the services people
might need at home, since many were optional benefits.
Finally, because of statutory rules that limited the use of federal matching
funds for care in public institutions, Medicaid furthered the dismantling of
state public institutions for long-term care and the proliferation of private
nursing homes to take their place.76 Medicaid made nursing homes a federally
funded alternative for people with developmental delays and psychological
illness, as well as an option for care for aging parents.77 Spending on nursing
homes increased exponentially after the passage of Medicaid, from $46
million in 1960 to $3.5 billion by 1967.78 Medicaid thus significantly reshaped
the institutional structure of long-term care.
Medicaid laid the foundation for a system of long-term care where only
the poorest Americans were socially insured and where private nursing homes
became the locus of care. It helped to dismantle public institutions but offered,
for a period of time, an institutional alternative that continued to provide
options for long-term care outside of the home. This institutional bias took the
pressure off family caregivers and reduced their obligation, at least
temporarily.
3.

Medicaid’s Recent Shift: Care Returns Home

Over the past few decades, however, Medicaid’s institutional bias has
receded, replaced by policies that aim to increase the autonomy of people with
disabilities by helping them remain at home but, in turn, increase obligations
for informal caregivers. Medicaid’s evolving policies, have resituated the
home as the locus of long-term care. This “rebalancing” has resulted in homeand community-based care increasing from eighteen percent of Medicaid’s
long-term care spending in 1995 to just over fifty percent in 2013.79 More than
three-quarters of people receiving long-term care assistance now live in home
or community settings, which, in nearly all cases, means in their home or in
the home of a family member.80
Medicaid’s shift to home-based long-term care has been largely
motivated by care recipients’ preferences to remain at home, which is why I
76

It prohibited payment for care in Institutions for Mental Diseases, which created incentives
for states to move people from state-funded mental asylums to private nursing homes that were
eligible
for federally Medicaid matching funds. See TORREY, supra note 48, at 73.
77
Watson, supra note 12, at 953.
78
Id. at 952.
79
Eiken et al., supra note 11, at 7 fig.1.
80
NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, INC., CAREGIVING IN THE U.S.: 2009, at 8 (2009)
[hereinafter
NAT’L
ALLIANCE,
CAREGIVING],
http://www.caregiving.org/data/Caregiving_in_the_US_2009_full_report.pdf
(“Half
of
caregivers say their loved one lives in his or her own home (51%), while 29% live together with
their care recipient. Only 4% of caregivers say that their care recipient lives in a nursing home
and the same percentage say their recipient’s home is an assisted living facility.”); STONE 2008,
supra note 70, at 3.
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describe it as policymaking from the care-recipient perspective. Early calls for
home-based care came from the “independent living movement,” an effort in
the 1970s initiated by several working-age people with disabilities in
Berkeley, to remain and live independently in their communities.81 Scandals
regarding the deplorable conditions in private nursing homes and public
institutions, coupled with concern over the growing costs of long-term care in
these institutions, fanned the flames of the movement.82 Efforts were driven
by the beliefs that outcomes are better and care is less expensive in home
settings, but both of these beliefs are at best weakly substantiated
empirically.83
Deinstitutionalization litigation in the 1980s and 1990s challenged the
conditions in and reliance on institutional care.84 This litigation was supported
by two very different groups: on the one hand, civil libertarians who wanted to
end care in settings perceived to be “oppressive, dehumanizing, and
antitherapeutic,” and, on the other, fiscal conservatives, who saw care at home
as a way to cut spending.85 They both aimed to unsettle institutions notorious
for poor conditions and expensive care.
This litigation played out successfully in two waves. The first challenged
the standards of treatment in public institutions on substantive due process
grounds, relying on the assumption—one that proved true—that court orders
requiring higher standards would make it too expensive for states to run these
institutions.86 The second wave relied on the then-recently passed Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and its mandate to administer services
“in the most integrated setting appropriate.”87 The ADA enabled litigants, for
the first time, to challenge conditions in publically-funded private institutions,
81
82
83

Batavia et al., supra note 48, at 528-29.
See Smith & Feng, supra note 28, at 32.
See Avalere Health, Medicaid-Financed Home and Community-Based Services Research: A
Synthesis,
A M.
HEALTH
CARE
ASS’N
5
(2007),
https://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/funding/documents/hcbs_research_synthesis.pdf
(reporting that home- and community-based services are not cost-effective for state budgets);
ANDREA WYSOCKI ET AL., LONG-TERM CARE FOR OLDER ADULTS: A REVIEW OF HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICES
VERSUS
INSTITUTIONAL
CARE
20-21
(2012),
https://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/369/1277/CER81_Long-TermCare_FinalReport_20121023.pdf (surveying studies comparing nursing homes, assisted living,
and HCBS programs and finding insufficient evidence on cost savings and most outcomes);
David C. Grabowski, The Cost-Effectiveness of Noninstitutional Long-Term Care Services:
Review and Synthesis of the Most Recent Evidence, 63 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 3, 20 (2006);
Roger J. Stancliffe et al., The Economics of Deinstitutionalization, in COSTS AND OUTCOMES OF
COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES (Roger J. Stancliffe & K.
Charlie Lakin eds., 2004) (showing the degree of cost savings as related to the degree of
deinstitutionalization
in a state).
84
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34
C
ARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).
85
Id. at 15.
86
Id. at 26. The Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Romeo held that
institutionalized persons have “constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable
care
and safety.” 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
87
28 C.F.R § 35.130(d) (2016).
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including the private nursing home industry that Medicaid grew.88 In 1999, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring held that
institutionalization, when avoidable, can be a form of discrimination against
people with disabilities. 89 States were required to make “reasonable
modifications” to their Medicaid programs in response to Olmstead.90
It is telling that a number of family members of people with disabilities
initially were part of the coalition but later splintered off because of concerns
that the legal strategies pursued would unsettle institutions without offering
alternatives, 91 leaving them with unmanageable caregiving obligations. As
they anticipated, the litigation created a tug of war for funding between
institutions and programs for home- and community-based services. When
enough people moved out of institutions, the fixed costs became too high to
keep them open for individuals (or their guardians) who preferred institutional
care, and a majority of public institutions closed. 92
In parallel to this litigation, Medicaid policies were increasingly making
it easier for states to deinstitutionalize long-term care. Most importantly,
Congress passed section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act in 1981, which
allowed states to seek waiver approval to offer home- and community-based
services instead of the institutional care that they otherwise were required to
provide for all qualifying beneficiaries.93 These waiver programs now operate
in nearly all states and constitute two-thirds of Medicaid spending on homeand community-based services.94
Policies that create incentives for states to shift to home- and communitybased care continued in the subsequent decades. In 1991, the Department of
Health and Human Services developed programs where states could offer
Medicaid beneficiaries the ability to “self-direct” long-term care benefits, 95
which means they may pay any capable providers of services, including
88

Some deinstitutionalization advocates have even opposed care in multi-unit communitybased settings and have attempted to label them “institutions” for purposes of Olmstead
challenges.
Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 48-49.
89
527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (reasoning that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes
the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work
options,
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment”).
90
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016). The exception is when modification would
“fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program or activity.” Id.
91
Some parents pursued separate litigation to improve the conditions in institutions. DAVID J.
R
OTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 45-50 (1984).
92
Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 7-9, 30; Stancliffe, et al., supra note 83, at 295.
93
Medicaid
Benefits,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Benefits/MedicaidBenefits.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); see also STONE, supra note 69, at 9-10 (summarizing
the 1915(c) home- and community-based services program). Waivers allow states to target
services
by age, diagnosis or geography, rather than having to be available statewide. Id. at 9.
94
TERENCE NG ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICE
PROGRAMS:
2012
DATA
UPDATE
6-7
(2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-medicaid-home-and-community-based-services-programs2012-data-update (estimating 74 percent of funds on home- and community-based services are
spent
under 1915(c) waivers).
95
Jeffrey S. Crowley, Medicaid Long-Term Services Reforms in the Deficit Reduction Act,
KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED 15 (2006) (describing Section 1115 waivers for
Cash and Counseling).
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parents of children with disabilities and spouses.96 The Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 and ACA created and extended a program called Money Follows the
Person, which offers enhanced federal Medicaid matching funds to a state for
twelve months after the state discharges an individual from institutional care
to home care.97 Nearly all states participate in this program, which, as of mid2015, had prompted the transition of 50,000 individuals out of institutions and
into home settings.98 In effect, these two programs pay states a premium to
move people out of institutions.
The result of this litigation and the policy reforms of the late twentieth
century is that after several decades of momentum in the other direction, the
law has quietly reaffirmed and solidified the home as the primary locale for
long-term care. Federal policy began the large-scale dismantling of public
institutions that states had established, a dismantling completed by civil rights
litigation. In their place, Medicaid initially favored private institutions, but in
recent years, this institutional bias has receded, replaced by favor for
programs for home- and community-based services. The law has thus shifted
long-term care back into the home and structurally reinforced its place there.
C. The Resulting Structure of Long-Term Care
Increasing reliance on home- and community-based services offers
considerable benefits from a care-recipient perspective. It has freed many
people from subpar conditions in facilities. People can stay in their homes and
live as independently as possible, which can be transformative. 99 But the
consequence of this reform has been to intensify and cement obligations for
friends and family.
The number of people living in institutions has sharply declined. The
census of people with developmental disabilities in state institutions is only
sixteen percent of what it was at its peak in 1967, and the population of state
and local psychiatric hospitals is nine percent of its peak and declining. 100
Age-adjusted institutional use among older Americans decreased by thirtyseven percent between 1984 and 2004.101 The actual number of older people
96

Benefits cannot be used to pay non-relative who owns or operates the facility or home in
which
the beneficiary lives, presumably to prevent moral hazard. Id.
97
Id. at 9-11;, Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports: Key Changes in the Health Reform
Law,
HENRY
J.
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.
1
(2010),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8079.pdf. The Deficit Reduction
Act also enabled states to expand eligibility for these services for higher earners without having
to
go through the waiver approval process. Id.
98
Money Follows the Person: A 2015 State Survey of Transitions, Services, and Costs, KAISER
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED 1 (2013) (reporting over 50,000 transitioned and another
10,000
in progress).
99
See, e.g., Watson, supra note 12, at 937.
100
Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 29. The census of people with a developmental disability in
state institutions peaked in 1967 at just under 200,000. Id. at 7. The census of people with
psychiatric
disabilities in state institutions peaked in 1955 at just under 560,000. Id. at 9.
101
DONALD L. REDFOOT & ARI HOUSER, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., MORE OLDER PEOPLE WITH
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living in institutions declined from a high of 2 million people in 1989 to 1.4
million in 2004, even as the absolute number of older Americans grew.102 By
one estimate, if the rates of institutional use and disability had both remained
constant, nearly 750,000 additional older people would have been living in
institutions by 2004.103 Likewise, by one estimate nearly 950,000 would have
been in mental institutions in 2000; only 50,000 individuals were in 2003.104
Medicaid spent $24 billion less on nursing homes in 2004 than the program
would have if institutionalization rates had remained constant from 1984.105
What is more, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
people with the very highest levels of disability living at home. 106 As one
example, from 1999 to 2004, there was a twenty-four percent increase in the
number of people living in home or community settings who need help
toileting and a nearly twenty percent increase in the number who need
mobility assistance.107 The greatest increases occurred among the oldest old,108
among widowed or unmarried people, especially women,109 and among lowerincome beneficiaries.110 This means that the number of poor, sick, old people
living at home is increasing, due largely to Medicaid policies.
Importantly, funding for care in home settings has been insufficient.
States have struggled to fund home- and community-based services. 111 The
Medicaid waiver programs for these services must be budget neutral, or cost a
state no more than what it would have spent to provide institutional care for
the same beneficiaries. Yet, studies that compare a similar person in home
versus institutional care suggest home-based care is not less expensive, as
anticipated, due in part to scale disadvantages of care in smaller settings and
also to the costs of developing networks of caregivers, crisis services, and case
management.112
When a beneficiary is living in a nursing home, personal care needs are
part of the total Medicaid-funded package. But when a beneficiary is living at
home, individual care needs can be and have been carved out. Unmet needs in
nursing homes are more visible and reprehensible, but unmet needs in home

DISABILITIES LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY: TRENDS FROM THE NATIONAL LONG-TERM CARE
SURVEY, 1984-2004, at 3 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/2010-08-disability.pdf
(using
age-adjusted data based on the National Long-Term Care Survey).
102
Id. at 21.
103
Id. at 25 (based on institutional use in 2004).
104
Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 9.
105
REDFOOT & HOUSER, supra note 101, at 24.
106
Id. at 25 (reporting that the share with disabilities in two or more ADLs increased from 57.5
to
69.5% from 1984 to 2004).
107
Id. at 27.
108
Id. at 28 (citing an 85% increase in people ages 85-94 and 240% increase in people over 95
years
old with disability in two or more ADLs living in the community).
109
Id. at 28 (citing an 81% increase for widowed people, as compared to a 39% increase for
married people, and a 79% increase for women, as compared to a 45% increase for men, living
with
disabilities in multiple ADLs in the community).
110
Id. at 44 (three out of five older persons living in the community with disabilities in two or
more
ADLs report incomes less than $20,000).
111
NG ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-13.
112
See studies cited supra note 82.
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settings are private and invisible to anyone other than close friends and
family.
Most people in home- and community-based long-term care waiver
programs have some unfunded care needs. To meet budget neutrality
requirements, states have developed these programs with gaps—excluding
some disabling conditions, limiting enrollment, or prohibiting aides or
assistants from helping with some personal care activities, such as bathing or
dressing. 113 Moreover, in 2013 more than 536,000 people were on waiting
lists for these programs with an average wait time of over two years.114 States
also carve out and underfund personal care services for beneficiaries in the
regular state programs. The few states that do pay for personal care limit it:
for example, Utah and West Virginia allow only sixty hours of personal care
per month, and Utah requires care be supervised by a registered nurse.115
To make matters worse, as part of a 1997 payment reform, Medicare
reduced funding for post-acute home health care. 116 In the three years
following these changes, Medicare spending on home health fell from $17.7
billion to $8.5 billion, and the number of Medicare home health beneficiaries
declined by 30 percent. 117 Even though this funding was for medical care,
never for personal assistance, its decrease has meant less nursing assistance
and rehabilitative care in the home, so informal caregivers are now doing what
medical professionals once did.
As a result of all of these policies, the average care recipient is
experiencing a decline in formal paid care through social insurance programs,
with the steepest decline in skilled care for those with more severe
disabilities.118 For the lucky ones, family members or friends are stepping in
to fill this gap in social insurance benefits. One study commented: “if patient
care did not suffer as a result of reduced support from formal care sources,
increased reliance on family caregivers is likely to have played an important
role in minimizing adverse consequences.”119 In fact, nearly three-quarters of
older people living in the community now receive family care only.120 The
work for the average informal caregiver has increased in level, complexity,
and intensity.121
113
114
115

NG ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-14.
Id. at 3
Medicaid Benefits: Personal Care Services, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2012),
http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/personal-care-services.
116
ARI HOUSER ET AL., AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., TRENDS IN FAMILY CAREGIVING AND PAID
HOME CARE FOR OLDER PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE COMMUNITY: DATA FROM THE
NATIONAL LONG-TERM CARE SURVEY 36 (2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/2010-09caregiving.pdf.
117
Id. (declining from 3.6 million to 2.5 million beneficiaries).
118
Id. at 32 (reporting a decline between 1999 and 2004 on the average hours of skilled care per
individual
with three or more ADL limitations).
119
Id. at 36.
120
Id. at 20.
121
NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 23 (noting that the “proportion of
caregivers of adults who provide help with at least one ADL increased from 50% in 2004 to
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***
Modern long-term care policy has pivoted to better serve care recipients’
preferences and autonomy by financing care in home settings instead of in
institutional ones. In concept, this shift is positive because it enables people
with disabilities to live as they wish. But the laser focus on risk from the carerecipient perspective has overshadowed attention to competing risks,
including those faced by family and friends.122 Under the auspices of serving
the best interests of individuals with disabilities, the law has cemented and
intensified responsibility for their friends and family—their next friends.
II. REIMAGINING LONG-TERM CARE RISK FROM THE NEXT-FRIEND
PERSPECTIVE
What if we instead considered long-term care risk from the perspective
of the closest friends and family of someone who is chronically ill or
disabled? From this perspective, the possibility of becoming responsible for
another’s long-term care can pose a major threat to an individual or family’s
security and wellbeing.
Long-term care law and social policy has left gaping holes. Family and
friends—“next friends”—have filled these gaps, most often by providing
long-term care themselves, in part because in most cases no other good option
exists. This tradition of long-term care as a private obligation is not new. But
the world has changed in ways that make de facto reliance on friends and
family increasingly untenable. Even if someone cares for another willingly,
and even if she derives deep pleasure from it, she often does so at a high cost
to herself. Whatever the friend or family member was engaged in before—be
it paid employment, raising a family, getting an education, serving her
community, nurturing a new relationship, or building a business—will be put
on hold and possibly abandoned altogether. For many, this disruption takes a
significant toll.
Legal scholarship has approached this problem in two ways. Health,
elder, and disability law and policy scholars generally think of long-term care
as an insurance problem. However, this literature treats care-recipient risk as
the sole, or primary, insurable risk.123 Some scholars acknowledge the burdens
58%
in 2009”).
122
Cf. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY 31 (Mark Ritter trans., 1992) (describing how the emphasis
on
some risks can serve to overshadow others).
123
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 73; Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Disabled Kids and Their
Moms: Caregivers and Horizontal Equity, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43 (2012)
(analyzing the Department of Veterans Affairs’ caregiver program in order to highlight the lack
of public services that benefit caregivers of disabled children); Thomas P. Gallanis & Josephine
Gittler, Family Caregiving and the Law of Succession: A Proposal, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
761 (2012) (proposing to amend succession law to provide an elective share to a family
member who was a primary caregiver, providing unpaid informal care to an elderly decedent);
Christopher C. Jennings & Christopher J. Dawe, Long-Term Care: The Forgotten Health Care
Challenge: Leading the Way to Broader Reform, 17 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 57 (2006) (arguing
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faced by informal caregivers and advocate for policies that offer better
support, compensation, or more accommodating workplaces.124 But even these
scholars presume, explicitly or implicitly, continued reliance on family care in
ways that ensconce it.
Second, there is a rich and complex literature by feminist legal scholars
focused on caregiving. The main thrust of this work has been to highlight the
undervaluation and gendered nature of care work, mostly with regard to
childcare125 and to a lesser extent long-term care.126 Scholars in this tradition
for a private-public financing method for long-term care); Richard L. Kaplan, Honoring Our
Parents: Applying the Biblical Imperative the Context of Long-Term Care, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 483 (2007) (proposing that Medicare pay for all nursing home care and
that any home care remain private responsibility); Marshall Kapp, Home and Community-Based
Long Term Services and Supports: Health Reform’s Most Enduring Legacy?, 8 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 9 (2014) (describing the shift to home- and community-based care);
Daniela Kraiem, Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy,
Commodification of Family Labor, and Community Resilience, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 671 (2011) (critiquing consumer-directed long-term care programs for effects on
paraprofessional and family care workers and arguing for better supports for caregivers);
Watson, supra note 12 (providing a history of long-term care policy and a critique of
Medicaid’s
institutional bias).
124
See, e.g., Czapanskiy, supra note 123, at 65-71 (proposing equity between state support for
parents providing long-term care for children and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ support
for family caregivers); Gallanis & Gittler, supra note 123 (proposing to amend succession law
to provide an elective share to a family member who was a primary caregiver); Richard L.
Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy and Family-Provided Care for Older Adults, 25 VA. TAX REV. 509
(2005) (advocating for tax credits for family caregivers); Carol Levine, Home Sweet Hospital:
The Nature and Limits of Private Responsibilities for Home Health Care, 11 J. HEALTH &
AGING 341, 349-52 (1999) (proposing various supports for family caregivers, including more
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, hospice funding, and home care benefits to
supplement
family care).
125
This body of work is larger than what I could possibly capture here. See, e.g., ALSTOTT, NO
EXIT, supra note 22 (claiming that society owes an obligation to parents to help preserve their
autonomy in exchange for the “no exit” obligation that they provide continuity of care for their
children and make the sacrifices necessary to do so); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH 38 (2004) (“Justice demands that society recognize that caretaking labor
produces a good for the larger society. Equality demands that this labor must not only be
counted, but also valued, compensated, and accommodated by society and its institutions . . .
.”); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT (2000) (arguing for a joint-property proposal to value caregiving work in the
home); Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 194 (1999) (contending that children are a public good and thus we should all
help pay for the costs of raising them); Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A
Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 17 (arguing for premarital security agreements as a way of valuing women’s domestic
work and ensuring them compensation in the case of divorce); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work,
Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983) (showing that
labor and welfare policy both prevent women from working outside the home and undervalue
the work they do within it); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1 (2005) (defending paid leave as a way to increase women’s workforce participation);
Katherine B. Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(1996) (showing how the law devalues domestic labor); Noah Zatz, Supporting Workers by
Accounting for Care, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 45(2011) (arguing that we count childcare as
part of the basket of goods for income-based programs and family caretaking as a form of work
for
benefits contingent on working).
126
Peggie Smith focuses explicitly on elder care, which she calls the “work-family issue of the
21st Century.” Peggie Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the
21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 351 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Elder Care].
Others address both childcare and long-term care together. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 124
(describing all care work as the source of derivative dependency); Lester, supra note 124
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have made compelling arguments for state support of caregiving based on the
idea of caregiving as a public responsibility, 127 a public good, 128 a basic
household need,129 or in order to help preserve women’s attachment to the
workplace.130
This Article offers a reframing of the problem of long-term care that
speaks to both groups. To the first, it suggests we consider next-friend risk a
coequal, insurable risk of long-term care. Elucidating the possible economic
and social harms a presumptive caregiver could face reveals a problem with
the way that current policies steer some people into caregiving roles at the
expense of other roles. Proposals to support informal caregivers privilege
women’s private caregiving at the expense of their long-term security and
engagement in important realms outside of the home. Any solution to the
problem must correct for this overvaluation.
To the feminist legal scholars, this Article offers a way of articulating the
costs caregivers face as a manifestation of a coherent social risk and frames
the state’s responsibility in terms of risk spreading.131 Focusing on long-term
care, instead of childcare more broadly, lends to this approach. The
responsibility for someone else’s long-term care is generally less predictable
and more skewed in duration and intensity than typical childcare needs.
Resulting costs fundamentally undermine caregivers’ financial, emotional,
and physical wellbeing.132
Thinking about these costs in terms of social risk does not require
someone to believe that care is a normative good or that society owes any
obligation to people who do it well (even though a belief that these costs arise
in service of doing something that we value can enhance a claim to shared
resources). So long as enough people have experienced or worry about the
possibility of becoming responsible for an aging parent, an ill spouse, or a
child with a disability, they can relate to it as a commonly shared threat to
security.
(offering a normative argument for paid leave for childcare and eldercare); ALSTOTT, NO EXIT,
supra note 22 (discussing caregiving for children with disabilities). Peggie Smith’s work also
examines long-term care from a labor perspective, showing how the devaluation of care work
equally affects formal long-term caregivers. See Peggie Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace
Casualties of Consumer-Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 537 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Home Sweet Home]; Peggie Smith, Aging and
Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1835 (2007). There is also a rich body of work on informal caregiving and long-term care
by sociologists, historians, economists. E.g., EMILY ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY?
(1991);
BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 31; HARTOG, supra note 29.
127
See
A
LSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 22.
128
See FINEMAN, supra note 125; England & Folbre, supra note 125.
129
See Zatz, supra note 125.
130
See Lester, supra note 125.
131
Some scholars advocate for more circumscribed social insurance solutions, including Anne
Alstott in the chapters of No Exit focused on parents caring for a child with disability and
Gillian Lester with regard to paid leave to enable workers to take a leave for family care.
ALSTOTT, NO EXIT, supra note 22; Lester, supra note 125. But none has intended to articulate a
coherent
theory of risk for all long-term caregivers nor to justify a comprehensive solution.
132
Anne Alstott argues that even more routine childcare can do the same. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT,
supra note 22.
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This Part examines what it would mean if, instead of deeming
responsibility for long-term care as a private obligation, we treated the
potential for becoming responsible for another as next-friend risk. Imagining
next-friend risk could justify a fundamental change in how the state finances
long-term care.
A. Long-Term Care as a Private Obligation
To conceive of a coherent idea of next-friend risk, it is necessary to
identify who bears this risk and how it arises. These questions are complex
because the obligation to care for someone is not inscribed in any one place,
but rather is communicated through social norms and ethical beliefs, and
sometimes through the law. The many sources that generate this obligation do
not, however, diminish its veracity; quite the opposite, they mutually reinforce
it, so that few people choose to walk away from a family member or friend in
need of long-term care.
It is not always clear ex ante who will take responsibility for another’s
care. One expert writes: “Family responsibility is an amorphous concept, with
fluid boundaries and interpretation. It may derive from religious teachings,
cultural tradition, emotional bonds, gratitude for past acts, or a sense of
obligation apart from love.”133 Regardless of why, the reality is that friends
and family provide long-term care even at significant costs to themselves and
even when not legally obligated to do so—prompting one scholar to call them
“trapped kin.”134
1.

Social Norms and Long-Term Care

Two different categories of arguments are proffered to explain why
family members provide long-term care for each other. One view is that
family care occurs because some people (usually women) have a “natural”
inclination or a preference for caregiving. Thus, they and others are best off
when they engage in caregiving, instead of other pursuits. In the past several
decades, however, arguments in this vein have been challenged and
discredited as tautological and often in service of certain political and
economic goals.135 Although many of us have a desire to care for those closest
133
134
135

Levine, supra note 124, at 344.
HARTOG, supra note 29, at 278.
See Rhonda J. Montgomery, The Family Role in the Context of Long-Term Care, 11 J.
AGING & HEALTH 383, 395 (1999) (discussing studies that discredit this notion). Martha
Fineman calls this argument “efficiency as exploitation.” FINEMAN, supra note 125, at 44. One
version of this idea is the human capital theory assertion that women have a comparative
advantage for caregiving, which rationalizes their specialization in housework and men’s in
wage-earning work. Gary Becker argues, for example, that women’s disadvantage in the
workplace stems from specialization in childcare and housework, rather than discrimination.
GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 22 (1981). For a longer discussion of this use of
human capital theory, its circularity, and studies that disprove it, see Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work,
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to us, explaining the decision that some people make to provide long-term
care for others to be the result of rational choice or efficient specialization is
unsatisfying, considering that in most cases it is the only option.
A second view is that norms—moral, religious, social, cultural, or legal—
and institutions shape a strong notion of individual, typically gendered
obligation to provide care.136 This is the idea that obligation is constructed in
part or whole. As Martha Fineman has described, “[C]hoice occurs within the
constraints of social conditions, including history and tradition. Such
traditions funnel individual decision making into prescribed channels, often
operating along practical and symbolic lines to limit and close down
options.”137 She describes how everything from outdated historical traditions,
to negative media attention on nannies or daycare, to the structure of the
public school system with short school days and summer recesses create
biases toward private caregiving. 138 Others have examined how sex
discrimination in the workplace,139 laws that do not tax the value of household
labor,140 and marriage and divorce laws141 all create incentives for women to
choose caregiving for family over other work. Fully describing the social
norms and institutions that shape such decisions is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a few brief illustrations specific to long-term care illuminate how
a sense of obligation might be communicated or reinforced.142
As with childcare, women disproportionately provide long-term care.
Gendered caregiving norms persist even though many women are less wellsituated than many men for the physical labor of long-term care. Gendered
expectations are shaped by families themselves: a “good” daughter, sister, or
wife will care for her mother, brother, or husband.143 That said, a significant
and increasing number of men also provide long-term care.144 The problem
described herein is at the same time gendered and universal.
The purpose of family is even reduced, at times, to its role in long-term
caregiving. The idea is that people have children in part to ensure someone to
care for them when they get old,145 a phenomenon one scholar describes as
100
COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1893 (2000).
136
See, e.g., Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, The Honor Commandment: Law, Religion, and the
Challenge of Elder Care, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 229 (2015) (examining through qualitative
empirical research how the Judeo-Christian “honor commandment” influences adult children’s
engagement
in their parents’ elder care).
137
FINEMAN, supra note 125, at 41.
138
Id.
139
See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
H
ARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
140
See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO L.J. 1571, 1589 (1995).
141
See Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 3, 27 (2010); Vicki Schultz & Michael Yarbrough, Will Marriage Make Gay and
Lesbian
Couples Less Egalitarian? A Cautionary Tale (draft on file with author).
142
For a concise discussion of this idea, see Montgomery, supra note 135, at 384-90.
143
Historically, such requests were often accompanied by promises of property or another
bequest. HARTOG, supra note 29, at 274-75.
144
See Jennifer L. Wolff & Judith D. Kasper, Caregivers of Frail Elders: Updating a National
Profile, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 344, 348 (2006).
145
See generally HARTOG, supra note 29 (discussing the complex and changing relationship
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“an efficient self-insurance strategy adopted by families.”146 To address the
problem of elderly with unmet care needs, he even proposes taxing the aged
without children for externalizing costs onto the public system and adopting
measures to increase fertility, particularly in the case of childless families.147
Medical practitioners often reinforce the concept of obligation to family
care. One long-term care expert describes her experience after her husband
became disabled in an accident, and a nurse foisted her husband’s soiled pants
on her, stating: “Take these away. Laundry is your job.”148 She also describes
being labeled a “selfish wife” by a social worker, who was trying to discharge
her husband from the hospital, for her refusal to take him home before she had
established professional home care.149 This view presumes that regardless of
her work or other obligations her care for her husband should come first.150
The law reinforces the norm of familial long-term care, in both implicit
and explicit ways. The evolution of long-term care policy in Part I illustrates
an implicit way that legal institutions rest on the expectations that friends and
family will provide care. Medicaid long-term care benefits with gaps would be
untenable if family and friends did not step in to fill these gaps. Sometimes
obligations in the law are more explicit. For example, until recently, Medicare
only covered hospice care if the beneficiary had a primary caregiver in place
(typically a family member). 151 For certified home health agencies, the
availability of family care at home is still a chief consideration in opening a
case to authorize Medicare-reimbursed home care.152
Explicit legal obligations, even though largely dormant now, have helped
shape expectations of private caregiving. All states have filial support laws,
modeled on English Poor Laws of 1601, which create explicit obligations to
pay for care for indigent family members. 153 Over half of the states’ laws
require adult children to care for or financially support indigent parents. 154
Although enforcement of these laws has waned since the New Deal’s creation
of a social safety net, they can nonetheless still shape social expectations,
between
increasingly aged parents and their children).
146
Douglas A. Wolf, The Family as Provider of Long-Term Care: Efficiency, Equity, and
Externalities, 11 J. AGING & HEALTH 360, 368-69 (1999) (elaborating on a theoretical model
developed
by Mark Pauly).
147
Id. at 373-74.
148
Carol Levine, The Loneliness of the Long-Term Caregiver, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1587,
1588 (1999). Such a statement is also a reflection of the historical conflict between providers of
medical
and non-medical care over status and role.
149
Id.
150
Research shows that medical professionals offer greater supports to male caregivers and
express lower expectations for them to provide care directly. See Montgomery, supra note 135,
at
392.
151
See Levine, Home Sweet Hospital, supra note 124, at 349.
152
See Levine, supra note 68, at 315-16.
153
See Pearson, supra note 48, at 270; see also Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult
Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 710, 717-20 (2007) (describing the modern
development of familial support obligations for disabled adult children and how these
obligations
in some ways resemble the original English Poor Laws).
154
Pearson, supra note 48, at 278.
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especially if periodically revived. Despite lying dormant for a while, filial
support laws have been invoked again in recent years in several states,
including in cases requiring adult children to reimburse a parent’s medical155
and nursing home expenses.156 These laws might be revived more frequently
as Baby Boomers impose higher costs on state Medicaid programs.157 As late
as the early twentieth century, many states passed laws that obligated parents
to care for adult children with disabilities—in some cases only if the disability
developed when the child was still a minor and, in others, even if a grown
child became disabled later in life.158
Common law has also defined the boundaries of family caregiving
obligations. Historian Hendrik Hartog has documented the evolution of legal
standards for elder care in the mid-nineteenth to twentieth century at a time
when, as he describes, free market opportunities were seen as emancipating
adult children from their parents.159 During this period, as they aged, people
used their estates, especially property, to bargain for care by family members,
and “contract created or re-created the family as a corporate unit.”160 What
had once been outside of the zone of commodification—tending to a family
member—became a bargaining chip for payment or property. Probate
decisions at times deemed a potential beneficiary more deserving of
inheritance if she fulfilled a promise to care for her aging parents.161 These
cases defined the level of care that was expected from family by establishing
what was above this level and could thus count as legally enforceable
consideration.162
Even in light of an overall trend of decreasing legal presumptions of
obligation, important exceptions reflect lingering gendered expectations. For
example, Hartog describes that litigation requesting fair compensation for care
work required a showing of “exceptional” work; somehow the care work by
men was usually perceived as more exceptional than that by women.163 This
idea that care is not exceptional (and thus requires no compensation) when
done by women arises even in modern cases, such as the 1993 California case
Borelli v Brusseau.164 The court found a wife’s agreement to provide intensive
care for her disabled husband at home in return for a promise of part of his
estate as without consideration. 165 As the dissent in Borelli argues
155

See Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Supr. Ct. 1994); Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys.,
Inc.
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See Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1077 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Health Care
Retirement
Corp. v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 724 (2012).
157
See
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Id. at 32.
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Id.
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Id. at 66.
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Id. at 257-58.
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16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993). But cf. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715-16
(N.Y. 1985) (recognizing the value of contributions made as a “spouse” and “homemaker” in a
divorce
action). Most modern cases go the way of O’Brien, not Borelli.
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Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17, 20 (“Personal performance of a personal duty created by the
contract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration supporting the indebtedness
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(emphatically), this court’s decision, relying on precedent from 1937 and
1941, was out of sync both doctrinally and with late twentieth-century social
norms.166 Nevertheless, it is an example of lingering articulation of the norm
that women in kinship relationships are expected to provide long-term care
and thus should neither expect nor receive anything, financial or otherwise, in
return.
In one case, a California court ordered parents to pay $3500 a month to a
fifty-year old son who became disabled after nearly two decades of work as a
lawyer.167 In an attempt to ensure that poor people with disabilities get needed
care, and also that they do not become a public expense, the law has expressly
obligated family members to serve as caregivers.
Gendered notions of familial obligation surface explicitly at times in
policymaking as well, leaving little to the imagination in terms of what drives
policy decisions. In congressional hearings on home health care,
Representative Tom Coburn suggested that paid care is inappropriate when a
family member could provide it. He attempted to illustrate the inefficiency of
government-funded home care by criticizing the fact that a diabetic patient
was using publicly financed caregivers despite the fact that his “wife was a
nurse, trained to measure sugars and give injections.” 168 Coburn’s
presumption was that the wife should take on the role of his caregiver, nursing
her husband, rather than others, as her job.
What is clear is that these various expressions of social expectations for
family care, even if waning somewhat in recent years, can influence the way
people respond when a family member or friend is in need of long-term care.
Sociologist Sandra Levitsky found that among unpaid family caregivers, most
discussed their own circumstances—even when precarious—in “legitimating”
terms as their responsibility and duty.169 Most informal caregivers struggled to
imagine a state role in long-term care, unless they had personally observed
how Medicaid could cushion the burden of caregiving.170 The bottom line is
that a complex set of social and legal norms have shaped expectations that
family and friends, especially women, will provide long-term care.
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in this case.”)
166
Id. at 22 (Poché., J., dissenting).
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D279304
(Ventura Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000).
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(2000),
https://policyparadox.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/reframing-home-health-2000.pdf
(citing Medicare Home Health Care, Skilled Nursing Facility, and Other Postacute Care
Payment Policies: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm. on Health, 105th
Congress
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2.

The Numbers on Informal Caregiving

The manifestation of a sense of private obligation is readily evident in the
number of people who take on responsibility for the long-term care of another
and the intensity of the care they provide. By one estimate, over forty million
people provided some unpaid assistance to someone with functional or
cognitive limitations in 2013.171 One study of Baby Boomers caring for their
parents found that the percentage of people providing basic personal care to
parents more than tripled between 1994 and 2008.172 Most informal caregivers
care for family, primarily for parents but also for grandparents, siblings,
spouses, and children.173 Yet, estimates suggest that as many as one-fifth of
informal caregivers provide care for a non-relative, including eleven percent
for a friend,174 illustrating how obligation reaches beyond narrow definitions
of family.
Two-thirds of informal caregivers are women. 175 Gendered differences
exist beneath the surface as well. For example, when compared to sons caring
for parents, daughters tend to provide more hours of care, engage in more care
tasks, and more often live with the parent. 176 Furthermore, as care needs
intensify, daughters more often continue caregiving than sons, who hire out
care.177 The average age of an informal caregiver is forty-eight years old.178
This means that the burden of providing informal long-term care especially
affects women during years that are critical for careers and, increasingly, for
raising children as the average maternal age rises.179
Differences in rates of long-term caregiving exist also across race and
income, although they are not as stark. The prevalence of informal caregiving
is highest in Hispanic and African-American households and lowest in AsianAmerican ones, in part driven by disparate levels of need. 180 Informal
171
172
173

Reinhard et al., supra note 26, at 1 (2011).
METLIFE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 18, at 7.
See NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 18 (reporting that 86% of survey
respondents reported caring for family, including 36% for parents, 14% for children, 8% for
parents-in-law, 8% for grandparents, 5% for a spouse or partner, and 5% for a sibling); Karen
Donelan et al., Challenged to Care: Informal Caregivers in a Changing Health System, 21
HEALTH AFF. 222, 224 (2002) (reporting that 79% of survey respondents providing informal
care said they cared for family: 42% for parents, 17% for grandparents, 7% for siblings, and 6%
for
children).
174
See NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 18; Donelan et al., supra note 173, at
224.
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Rhonda Montgomery et al., Family Caregiving, in HANDBOOK OF GERONTOLOGY: EVIDENCEBASED APPROACHES TO THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY (James A. Blackburn & Catherine N.
Dulmus
eds., 2007).
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See NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 17.
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Id.
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See JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2009, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
R
EPORTS 6 fig. 4 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf.
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See NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 12 (reporting a prevalence of
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http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2005/aug/a-look-atworking-age-caregivers-roles--health-concerns--and-need-for-

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

16:2 (2016)

caregivers are disproportionately low-income: one study estimates 44 percent
of working age caregivers are in households below 200 percent of the federal
poverty level, as compared with 33 percent of non-caregivers.181
The variation in informal caregiving is significant, measured both in
duration and in intensity of care. On average, the duration of caregiving is 4.6
years, skewed upward by the 3 in 10 caregivers who provide care for five
years or more.182 The average caregiver provides just over twenty hours of
care per week, but thirteen percent of people provide forty hours or more of
care per week.183 Over fifty percent of informal caregivers provide assistance
with at least one activity of daily living, most often transferring or getting
dressed, and all with at least one instrumental activity of daily living, such as
housework, grocery shopping, or preparing meals.184
Changes in medicine and medical reimbursement have increased the
intensity of informal care.185 Medicare reform in 1983 reduced payment for
care in hospital settings, leading to what is often called “quicker and sicker”
discharge.186 Sociologist Cameron Macdonald calls these policies “healthcare
offloading” because of the way that they shift the burden of care from medical
institutions to families.187
As a result, informal caregivers report providing higher-intensity levels of
care.188 One study found that over forty percent of informal caregivers were
performing at least one medical task, including wound care, intravenous
medication, and operating dialysis and home infusion machines.189 Some of
the equipment involved is complex, including connecting ventilators to
tracheostomy sites, responding to alarms and failures, programming feeding
tubes and monitoring for blockages or signs of infection, and noting medical
complications quickly, including signs of pneumonia. 190 Most informal
caregivers have little or no training and provide care in a home setting with no
help from paid aides, housekeepers, or others.191 One-quarter said they were
support/854_ho_lookatworkingcaregiversroles_ib-pdf.pdf.
181
Ho et al., supra note 180, at 2. Of course, these households might be lower income because
of
caregiving obligations.
182
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183
Id. at 21.
184
Id. at 22-24. Those caring for children help with most Childcare Support Activities (CSAs).
Id
at 27.
185
See generally Sara M. Moorman & Cameron Macdonald, Medically Complex Care and
Caregiver Strain: Results from the Cash and Counseling Demonstration and Evaluation Study,
53 GERONTOLOGIST 417 (2012) (describing the increase of medicalization of home care and its
effects
on family caregivers).
186
REDFOOT & HOUSER, supra note 101, at 8 (describing the creation of the Medicare
Prospective Payment system to reimburse a fixed amount for an episode of care, resulting in
shorter
hospital stays).
187
Cameron Macdonald, Is There A Doctor in the House?: Family Members Providing
Complex
Medical Care at Home (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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Donelan et al., supra note 173, at 224.
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See Moorman & Macdonald, supra note 185, at 408.
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See NAT’L ALLIANCE, CAREGIVING, supra note 80, at 32, 59.
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performing medical tasks because their care recipient had been sent home “too
soon,” and one in eight reported being aware of a mistake they had made in
medical management, showing that this higher-intensity care puts family
caregivers in a vulnerable position where they may make errors that harm a
loved one. 192 Not surprisingly, the negative health, financial, social, and
professional impact is greater among caregivers who assist in health care
activities. 193
As one informal caregiver and scholar described: “I feel abandoned by a
health care system that commits resources and rewards to rescuing the injured
and the ill but then consigns such patients and their families to the black hole
of chronic ‘custodial’ care.”194 What next friends do for others is herculean,
both in terms of the time spent and the ways that they offer assistance.
B.

Obligation in a Changing World

The world has changed in ways that make this type of intense, private
obligation untenable. Long-term care needs are growing with the shifting
demographics of the population. Medical advances are keeping people alive
longer and sicker. In 2009, the life expectancy at birth for an American was
nearly seventy-nine years, ten years longer than it was in the mid-twentieth
century and twenty years longer than the beginning of the twentieth
century.195 Heroic trauma care and miracle drugs are preserving and extending
lives of people with serious injury.196 And the number of “old old” is growing
as a percentage of the population. 197 More Americans suffer from chronic
disease than ever before, and some studies suggest the proportion of
Americans with chronic conditions may continue to rise. 198 Plus, rates of
childhood disability have increased as much as sixteen percent from 2001 to
2010.199
As the Baby Boomers transition from the caregiving to the care-receiving
generation, the probability of caring for an aging family member or friend is
increasing. The ratio of people in need of care to potential caregivers is
192
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at
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the next 30 years (citing to a confidential client memorandum from Rand Corporation that was
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increasing as people live longer and have fewer kids, translating into a higher
likelihood that any one individual will become responsible for another.200
At the same time, family and community are evolving in ways that
destabilize the provision of informal caregiving in households. A higher
percentage of women are in the labor force than ever before: from one-third in
1950 to nearly two-thirds at the beginning of the twenty-first century.201 The
frequency of single-parent households has also risen, from twenty percent in
1980202 to thirty-four percent in 2011.203 And for households where there is a
married couple, the percentage in which both spouses work out of the home
increased from just over forty-four percent in 1967 to sixty percent at the
beginning of the twenty-first century.204
At one time, people lived in communities where they could share care
obligations, but people are leaving their communities more often than before.
In 2010, 41 percent of Americans lived outside the state in which they were
born, as compared to 26.5 percent in 1950. 205 Sixty-three percent of adults
have moved to a new community at least once in their lives, while only thirtyseven percent have never left their hometowns.206
All of these changes make the burdens that have been shouldered
privately increasingly untenable for many, exposing long-term caregiving
because it no longer folds quietly into the familial fabric. The combination of
law and policies that move care back into the home, in addition to the
changing home environments, has resulted in costs too significant to ignore.
C. The Cost of Private Obligation: The Invisible Copayment
When someone becomes responsible for another’s long-term care, the
burdens can be high.207 Some of these burdens can be quantified in monetary
200
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dividing total number of one-parent households living with their own children under age 18 in
table FG6, 11,759, by total number of households with parents living with their own children in
F1).
204
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24 (2014). A married-couple household is defined as a husband and wife, with or without
children, who maintain their own household. Id. The number of dual-earner families decreased
in
the last years of collected data (2009-2011), during the recession. Id.
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Ren, supra note 15, at 4.
206
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How one defines “burdens,” “harm,” or “costs” greatly shapes the content of what is
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terms. Others, even if not easily measurable financially, are no less harmful,
including damage to intimate relationships or health and an inability to pursue
life goals. These costs are, in effect, the invisible copayment of current longterm care social insurance programs.
It is normatively and empirically difficult to put a value on the invisible
copayment. 208 As noted above one conservative estimate of replacement
wages for the hours of informal caregiving for adults in 2013, when valued at
average caregiving wages of $12.51 per hour, is $470 billion. 209 Other
estimates that measure that costs instead as opportunity costs to informal
caregivers are similar in magnitude. 210 For a subset of informal caregivers,
who leave or reduce work to provide care, the total financial losses can be
staggering. The average informal caregiver who leaves the workforce to care
for a parent faces losses including foregone income, pensions, earned interest,
benefits, and retirement benefits, including Social Security. One study
estimates these losses to be $300,000, on average, and others estimate them to
be as high as $600,000 for some caregivers. 211 For someone caring for a
parent who reduces working hours but does not leave a job, studies estimate
average losses still near $200,000.212 Among all informal caregivers twenty
percent take a leave of absence. 213 More than one-third of those caring for
their parents leave the workforce or reduce working hours.214 Considering that
the median household net worth was just under $70,000 in 2011,215 losses at
this level are devastating for all but the wealthiest households. An estimate of
the aggregate costs of Baby Boomers caring for their parents, measured in lost
wages, Social Security, and pension, is nearly $3 trillion dollars. 216 Not
surprisingly, one-third of caregivers report moderate to high financial hardship
due to caregiving.217
Because of its gendered nature, informal caregiving contributes to wage
and employment gaps.218 Women are more likely than men to disrupt or leave
208
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work for caregiving.219 Evidence shows that extended periods of leave from
work significantly hamper professional advancement.220 Even those who stay
in the workplace are unlikely to be able to perform as strongly as those not
providing long-term care. Long-term caregivers are twice as likely to miss six
or more days of work than non-caregivers.221 By one estimate, U.S. businesses
experience nearly $30 billion a year in lost productivity from full-time
employees who are caring for family because of absenteeism, distraction, and
reduced hours.222 Employers pay about eight percent more for health care for
employees who care for an older person, totaling over $13 billion per year.223
Employers are, in turn, less likely to invest in employees who provide longterm care.224
Informal caregiving can contribute to a cycle of poverty, especially since
informal caregivers are more likely to be in low-income households. 225
Political scientist Joe White describes: “Reliance on intra-family transfers
carries the same risks as personal investments, especially since individuals
with low incomes tend to have children with low incomes, and so a parent’s
misfortune would be doubly visited upon his or her children.”226 To the extent
someone depletes her resources or forgoes savings and retirement benefits to
care for another, she will be less likely to be able to afford care for herself
later if needed. Thus, family caregiving can solidify class lines as each
generation sacrifices its financial security for another one.
Quantifying harm only in terms of hours of unpaid care or lost income,
however, does not begin to capture the impact of informal caregiving on
people’s lives. A considerable body of research measures “secondary strains,”
including effects on “family and occupational role and social and recreational
219
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activities, and intrapsychic strains such as loss of self-esteem, loss of self, role
captivity, and lowered sense of competence.” 227 This research documents
significant health effects and psychosocial and behavioral impacts. The selfreported health of informal caregivers is worse than that of non-caregivers,
and it declines the longer someone provides care.228 In one study, over twothirds of respondents reported that long-term caregiving was the top source of
stress in their lives.229 Research has shown that forty to seventy percent of
people caring for older adults have symptoms of depression and twenty-five to
fifty percent meet diagnostic criteria for major depression, far outpacing the
rates in the general population.230 Significantly, health status is worse for an
informal caregiver who felt she had no choice in whether to provide care.231
Even beyond measurable physical and psychosocial harms, taking
responsibility for the long-term care of another, especially for someone who
requires prolonged intensive care, can consume life in ways difficult to
quantify but nonetheless important. Long-term care responsibility can harm
existing relationships or create barriers to entering into new intimate
relationships. Anne Alstott has argued that social policy should be just as
concerned about a wider range of risks that can threaten wellbeing and
security, which she refers to as disruptions in “affective life.”232 In one study,
one-half of caregivers reported sacrificed time with friends and family.233
An informal caregiver could lose the chance to engage in other activities
that define her, fulfill her, or create future opportunity for her. Both because of
the economic insecurity it can create and equally because of the way it can
absorb a great proportion of someone’s time and mental space, responsibility
for another’s long-term care can impede pursuit of one’s life goals—what
some call self-determination, self-actualization,234 or engagement in “the life
of a civilized being.”235 Although more difficult to measure, these harms are
nonetheless devastating.
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In sum, even if people take on caring for another with great generosity
and love, long-term care is extremely demanding. Even in the best of
circumstances, it will take a toll.
D. Reimagining Private Obligation as Social Risk
What if we reimagine these costs as the result of next-friend risk, rather
than an individual obligation? Long-term care clearly undermines the security
of modern American families and can be understood as a source of risk for
next friends.
What does it mean for something to be a “risk”? Technical definitions
describe risk in actuarial terms as a probabilistic harm from a particular
hazard.236 Next-friend risk clearly fits this conception. Most of us could end
up responsible for the long-term care for another, even if not all of us will.
The costs that result are stochastic, skewed, and, in the worst cases,
devastating.237 Responsibility is only triggered when illness or injury affects a
family member or friend, rarely due to the fault of a next friend, as examined
in more detail below. Even if someone finds providing long-term care for a
loved one rewarding, it is not a role that most people anticipate and
embrace.238 Taking an ex ante, collective view, the possibility of responsibility
for the long-term care of another shares many attributes with other phenomena
that we have treated as serious social risks—from workplace injury to the
potential of poverty in old age from outliving ones savings.
Yet not all probabilistic harms are considered and treated as salient social
risks. Sociocultural risk scholars examine how what a society defines as risk is
socially mediated.239 French historian and philosopher François Ewald takes
236
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an especially relativist stance: “anything can be a risk; it all depends on how
one analyzes the danger, considers the event.”240 Unlike Ewald, most scholars
in this tradition believe that some measurable danger underlies what we see as
risk.241 In other words, risk is both objective and socially mediated. This way
of defining risk explains why even if a hazard is not presently thought of as a
social risk, it does not mean it could and should not be. Calling a phenomenon
“risk” signals two things: that it causes probabilistic harm and also that it is
salient as such.
Certain harms have greater salience as risky, based on how they are
framed, by whom, and with what agenda in mind. Sociologist Ulrich Beck
describes an “overproduction of risks,” when interested parties magnify some
risks in order to, in turn, diminish concomitant risks. As an example, he
explains that “the dramatization of climactic consequences ‘minimizes’ the
risk of nuclear energy.”242 This practice is pervasive. The risk from overly
aggressive (and perhaps unscrupulous or criminal) banking practices is
tolerated in light of claims that certain financial institution are “too big to
fail.”243 In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, a lawsuit claiming serious
injury from a generic anti-inflammatory drug, the pharmaceutical company’s
lawyers highlighted the harm of rising health care costs due to brand-name
drugs in order to suggest that the low risk that a generic drug would cause
someone’s skin to burn and slough off, as it did to Karen Bartlett, was not
unreasonably dangerous.244 A web of interested parties and complex dynamics
shape the collective concern with certain risks and not with others.245
However, conceptions of risk can evolve so that something that was
previously seen as individual cost or misfortune comes to be thought of as a
salient social risk. John Witt describes this type of transformation behind the
creation of workman’s compensation.246 Workplace injuries occurred before
industrialization, but by the end of the nineteenth century they manifested in
more frequent, more devastating, and more visible ways. 247 In light of this
evolution, advocates worked to transform workplace injury from something
conceived of as a source of individual misfortune or fault to a risk inherent in
large
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industrialization. This was achieved by framing the injuries as an unavoidable
threat to the economic security of American families.248 This framing made a
collective solution seem imperative. In turn, the creation of a collective
approach to pay for workplace injuries became the springboard for a “new
conception of social responsibility . . . that aimed not just to spread the risks of
injury, but also to take on more fundamental risks such as poverty.”249
The idea of social responsibility to address such risks laid the foundation
for the New Deal, creating what one scholar characterized as a “palpable
experience of solidarity that helped underwrite the forms of collectivism that
were successfully implemented.”250 In fact, risk displaced other justifications
for state support, as part of what has been described as a modern shift from a
“welfare society” to a “risk society.”251 Costs understood to be the result of
uncontrollable threats to family or individual security made a greater claim to
state resources.252 Redistribution was not the explicitly stated goal; security
was.
As other harms were perceived as similar in nature to workplace injury—
unavoidable and significant—they became worthy targets for social
insurance.253 For example, as hospitals modernized and medical care became
both more expensive and more effective, the costs of medical care threatened
American families’ financial security, and insurance for medical care was
needed to protect the family wage. Medicare and Medicaid were enacted. The
creation of Social Security was in part based on the recognition that longer
lives heightened the risk of a family outliving its savings and understanding
this problem as a collective scourge and not as individual misfortune. Each of
these challenges that had long been managed mostly privately came to be
perceived as proper zones of state support.
In turn, the creation of social insurance to manage a particular harm
helped to transform the social understanding of these harms from a private
obligation to a collective concern. Ewald describes that insurance “makes
risks appear where each person had hitherto felt obligated to submit
248
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resignedly to the blows of fortune.”254 He calls this transformation the process
of the “insurantial imaginary,”255 implying that the creation of insurance itself
affirms a particular harm as risk.
In recent years, the language of risk has often been coopted by those who
take the position that it is an individual’s responsibility to manage risk. Risk
spreading approaches are crumbling under the weight of moral hazard—the
idea that too much insurance discourages efficient caution.256 Jacob Hacker, in
The Great Risk Shift, calls this trend the “personal responsibility crusade” and
shows how it has led to policies that invisibly undercut Americans’ economic
security. 257 As risk has become so strongly associated with this neoliberal
agenda, some scholars seek a new language to advocate for state policies that
can increase security.258
But proponents of social change should not reject the language of risk; it
has a long history of motivating monumental social policies and in the right
context could do so again. As Hacker suggests: “Americans may be willing to
turn a blind eye to growing inequality, confident in the belief that their own
standard of living is still rising. But economic insecurity strikes at the very
heart of the American Dream.”259 It leaves even those who have done all the
right things to achieve a place in the middle class fearful about having the rug
pulled out from under them.
The idea of next-friend risk recasts the problem of private obligation for
long-term care in a more compelling way for the public and for policymakers,
many of whom worry personally about the possibility of becoming
responsible for an aging parent, sick spouse, or disabled child. Recognizing
next-friend risk can transform long-term care from an old-people problem into
a universal concern. Public long-term care funding has been vulnerable to
attack as “yet another” transfer from today’s already stretched workers to the
elderly. If instead we see the problem of long-term care as a threat to people’s
financial security and health during their prime earning and child-rearing
years, solving it, in effect, is a transfer to the young, working class. Threequarters of informal caregivers are under age sixty five and three-fifths are in
the labor force.260 In other words, any social resources and tax dollars spent on
the problem would benefit the primarily working-age next friends as much as
the care recipients. Seeing long-term care as a problem equally for care
254
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recipients and for next friends could broaden coalitions for reform, uniting the
interests of labor, informal caregivers, older voters, and disability advocates.
Next-friend risk, however, has been sidelined. The policy focus on longterm care risk from the care-recipient perspective has served to overshadow
the concomitant risk to next friends. The laws and policies described in Part I
have hidden next-friend risk from the public eye, in the home and off the
balance sheets, by inscribing it as private and individual—unsurprising, given
the gendered nature of long-term caregiving. The notion that family care is a
personal, perhaps moral, obligation that people provide willingly is politically
convenient. It has enabled policymakers to avoid dealing with the full cost of
long-term care, instead leaving others to experience the costs privately and
invisibly.
E. The Implications of Imagining Next-Friend Risk
Understanding the possibility of becoming responsible for another as a
social risk—and not as a private obligation—has at least four major
substantive implications for long-term care policy.
First, it changes the scale of the problem. Current social insurance policy
hides costs borne by next friends. Even considering just the $470 billion
estimate of the current market value of hours spent caregiving would require
long-term care funding at triple current Medicaid levels. 261 Although the
United States spends more per capita than other developed countries on nearly
every other category of health care, it spends comparatively less on long-term
care. 262 There is good reason to spend more. Even if Medicaid funding is
unlikely to triple anytime soon, accurate accounting of the size of the problem
could anchor policymakers on a more realistic number.
Second, as discussed just above, recognizing the problem of next-friend
risk highlights its similarity to other problems that have prompted the creation
of social welfare policy and social insurance to spread risk. At a moment in
time when individualistic sentiment runs strong, the fact that many people can
relate personally to next-friend risk could be a boon.263 In other words, people
261
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might be motivated out of self-regard to support a solution that offers
communitarian benefit. More so, where intensive care needs persist over time,
few Americans could shoulder the burden privately, suggesting the necessity
of a universal social insurance approach. Universal programs are also more
popular and less politically vulnerable than means-tested ones, like Medicaid.
Third, even with an infusion of funding, it is necessary to see the
problem from the perspective of next friends in order to design policy with the
flexibility to mitigate the risk they face. Next-friend risk could be mitigated to
some extent by simply increasing Medicaid funding for long-term care, but
even a large increase could have limited benefit if not done with an eye
toward addressing next-friend risk.
In some cases, the best way to mitigate risk is to make family caregivers
whole by paying them for caregiving. In others, it is by enabling them not to
provide care in the first place and thus limit the extent of the negative impact
on their careers or lives. It is possible to mitigate risk fully from the carerecipient perspective, but to leave next friends vulnerable by, for example,
pouring money into current Medicaid programs that have a bias for family
care. Even if Medicaid compensated all hours of informal care at a fair wage,
it would perpetuate harm—financial and nonmonetary—for kin who are better
off in the long run if they do not provide care, but who have no other option.
Conversely, if a huge infusion of funding were made available only to pay for
outsourced care, the same would occur. Some people would be unable to find
a satisfactory way to pay for care and would instead provide care themselves,
even without pay. Or under some states’ policies, the only outsourcing option
is nursing home care. Someone unwilling to put a parent in a nursing home, or
whose parent is unwilling to live in a nursing home, might instead still provide
care herself.
When someone becomes responsible for the care of another, she should
be able to decide whether to provide care herself or to pay someone else to do
it (or some combination). Insurance must be designed to enable a next friend
to toggle more freely between these two choices and thus to use benefits in a
way that minimizes her own insecurity, however she might define it, and to
balance caring for a family member with other pursuits. Current policy is
focused so narrowly on care-recipient risk that it does not even see the need
for this toggle. I discuss in detail below why such a toggle is imperative and
what it requires. Conceptually, seeing next-friend risk reveals the need for it.
Fourth, especially if no additional money is spent, understanding nextfriend risk raises the (admittedly uncomfortable) question of whether we
should think differently about tradeoffs between mitigating care-recipient and
next-friend risk, even if it means compromise in some cases for the care
recipient. For example, if an elderly widower has a stroke, the goal of current
Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries, 63 AM.
SOC. REV. 661, 664-65 (1998) (suggesting that redistributive institutions have societal feedback
effects).
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long-term care law and policy is to protect his autonomy by providing
adequate support in the least restrictive setting appropriate, as required by
Olmstead. 264 If his daughter moves him into her home—the solution that
Medicaid policies for home- and community-based care increasingly
encourage—this goal could be fully met at the lowest possible public cost. But
his daughter may have to reduce working hours or leave a secure job with
benefits, threatening her family’s long-term finances and possibly health and
wellbeing. Such results, where each generation sacrifices its security for the
previous one, are simply not sustainable.
***
As the demands for care are becoming more intense and the structure of
families is changing, care needs do not fit seamlessly into the household, and
the risk long-term care poses to next friends is increasingly difficult to ignore.
When viewed in the aggregate, next-friend risk appears as threatening as the
risk of disability from the care recipient perspective and as many of the other
phenomena that have motivated state action.
No social policy could neutralize all of the harm people experience when
friends or family need long-term care. It is inevitably painful to see a loved
one who needs help feeding herself or getting in and out of bed, even if the
costs of her care are fully compensated. Nor could any policy even ameliorate
all economic harms. Doing so would be too complex and too expensive. But
long-term care policy could be designed to minimize next-friend risk better
than it does today. Considering the risk of long-term care equally from this
perspective is a first step toward better long-term care policy.
III. SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR NEXT-FRIEND RISK
A. The Case for Social Insurance for Next-Friend Risk
Imagining next-friend risk implies that it is something social insurance
could mitigate. Here, I make the case for why it should. Social insurance
spreads costs that a society sees as inefficient, undesirable, or unjust for an
individual to bear. It can be used to promote economic efficiency or address
private-insurance market failures.265 Social insurance can also “change [the]
character” of an existing market,266 such as when people cannot afford private
insurance that would be welfare enhancing,267 for paternalistic reasons, or to
264
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advance social justice goals. 268 Social insurance policies that are more
sensitive to next-friend risk could be more efficient and result in a more just
distribution of the costs of long-term caregiving. As will be discussed in Part
IV, these goals could be advanced by a comprehensive social insurance
program or even just incremental changes to existing social insurance policies.
Mitigating next-friend risk would serve a core utilitarian goal—to protect
people from income loss that can undermine economic security.269 Marmor
and coauthors describe social insurance as “a set of interventions designed to
reduce the impacts of common threats across each person’s life cycle, threats
that simply cannot be countered effectively by individual prudence and private
markets.”270 As explained above, next-friend risk poses precisely this type of
threat.
Yet, social policy does not always intervene to make lives more secure,
even if it could, which raises the question of why next-friend risk should be a
priority. Family or friends often take responsibility for each other in cases of,
for example, unemployment, property damage, or unmanageable debt.
Furthermore, U.S. social welfare policy excludes most caregiving, even
though spreading the costs of such activity has the potential for significant
welfare benefits.271
One possibility is that next-friend risk in the case of long-term care is not
exceptional, and the state should be equally concerned with costs family face
in these other situations. Policymakers select out some from among many
insurable risks. 272 From this perspective, what becomes insured is more a
matter of what suits a social and political moment than any valid comparative
claim to shared resources.
Yet, there are also substantive reasons why addressing next-friend risk is
especially important. As Section II.A described, the social norms for taking
care of a family member or friend who is physically vulnerable are strong and
engender sacrifice. It is less expected that a family member would sacrifice
her own financial security, family, career, or wellbeing to bail a sibling out of
credit card debt or to bankroll an unemployed child indefinitely. Next-friend
risk arises in service of something that we expect people to do and that we

Risks,
J.
RISK
&
UNCERTAINTY
(forthcoming),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/16883007/Shavell_768.pdf.
268
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 18-23; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 265, at 20-29
(1986) (distinguishing egalitarian justifications from utilitarian ones because they have equality
at their center and not as a potential byproduct). Abraham describes libertarianism as a third
influence, in addition to utilitarianism and egalitarianism, and contends that “intuitive
pragmatism,”
a mix of these three values, informs insurance regulation. Id. at 29.
269
E.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 45.
270
MARMOR ET AL., supra note 24, at xx.
271
Alstott, supra note 141, at 27; See generally HACKER, supra note 23 (making the case for
stronger
social insurance programs to spread risk).
272
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 25 (“Social insurance . . . is defined concretely for
any society by the complex interaction of collective purposes and acceptable political
techniques.”). Ewald calls this process the combination of insurantial imaginary and political
imaginary. Ewald, supra note 239, at 198.

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

16:2 (2016)

perceive as a public benefit: providing care for people with serious illness or
disability.273
Furthermore, the consequences of not helping a sibling in credit card
debt are less dire, in part because the law and private insurance already offer
means for relief. A family member in debt can file for bankruptcy. Someone
who loses a job can claim unemployment insurance. But in the case of longterm care, it is nearly impossible for people to meet their needs without
others’ help, even if they qualify for Medicaid benefits.
Next-friend risk has higher stakes. Just the possible monetary losses
outlined above can set a caregiver up for a future with insufficient resources to
meet her own basic needs. Few ways that family members aid each other
approach this level of cost and financial insecurity. Addressing next-friend
risk could thus significantly bolster the financial security of American
families.
Social insurance also serves egalitarian goals. John Rawls argued that a
just distribution of basic resources is defined by the share held by the worst
off person in society. 274 Social insurance offers protection against the
depletion of any one individual’s basic resources. Graetz and Mashaw justify
social insurance in such terms: “Given little information about where they
would start or end up in the income distribution, it might seem in everyone’s
interest to agree to the collective provision of affordable . . . insurance in order
that they all have reasonable protection against foreseeable risks.” 275 Anne
Alstott has expressed a similar goal in “liberal egalitarian” terms. She
contends that “a central function of the state is to create institutions that
ensure to every person the conditions of autonomy: the chance to develop the
capabilities that one needs to formulate, choose, and pursue a vision of the
good life.”276 Social insurance can serve as such an institution that protects
conditions of autonomy, in terms of money or time.
Although people disagree on what particular basic resources or
conditions are necessary to ensure opportunity,277 it is indisputable, under any
273
274
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definition, that responsibility for another’s long-term care would deplete these
resources and disrupt such conditions. Just the potential financial losses would
do so. Yet, long-term caregiving also depletes health and time, which are as
necessary as money as conditions to pursue life goals. Research shows that
even those caregivers who see caregiving as part of their purpose in life and
report personal enrichment from it are no less likely to suffer a loss of
identity, referred to tellingly as “loss of self” or “role engulfment.”278
These harms are made especially unjust by the fact that they are borne
inequitably, especially by women. Their long-term care responsibilities
exacerbate weaker workplace attachment and the wage gap. Social policy
sensitive to next-friend risk could promote conditions of autonomy for
everyone and, in so doing, also reduce the disparate impact of next-friend risk
on women’s careers, earnings, health, and wellbeing.
B. Principles To Guide the Design of Social Insurance for Next-Friend Risk
Designing social insurance in a way that promotes greater security and
simultaneously protects a next friend’s ability to make life choices is not
simple. Imagine if the state were to provide all long-term care in-kind, perhaps
with the option for either nursing home care or formal caregivers at home.
This approach could reduce the insecurity that informal caregivers face, by
taking them out of the business of long-term caregiving altogether. They
would be free to engage in their professions, child-rearing, civic work,
education, and leisure activities, as before, and to spend time with a friend or
family member as they wish but not as the primary caregiver. This approach is
conceptually simple. Yet, it would be both difficult to implement, at least in
the short term, and incomplete. Even with the current reliance on family and
friends, there is a substantial shortage of formal care providers, as discussed
below. No feasible path forward could cut all family and friends out,
especially in the short term.
Further, providing only in-kind benefits would not achieve the goal of
greater security for everyone.279 Some people would decline an in-kind benefit
to provide unpaid informal care themselves, either because they want to do so
or because a family member refuses anything but family care. Even if
someone deeply values providing care—enough to do it for free when other
options exist—we might nonetheless want to protect her from experiencing
insecurity if she chooses to do so, especially if we value caregiving by friends
and family. In other words, we might not want Mother Teresa to die homeless
and starving just because she truly preferred to care for others for free.
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Likewise, for all of the reasons already articulated, shifting to a system of
only family care, even if compensated, would not be a good solution either. It
would require more people to disrupt other pursuits, even when doing so is not
in their best interests.
A comprehensive approach must recognize and support the two ways
that someone could respond to a family member or friend in need—by
providing or paying for care. The best policies would be designed to allow
someone to toggle between these two choices, to protect her security and,
equally, her self-determination.
One version of a toggle might require social insurance policies that are
neutral on their face. Policies could allow next friends to use benefits
interchangeably to provide care or to pay someone else to do so. This
approach is common in other countries with universal long-term care
insurance.280
Each next friend could weigh potential harms and benefits and decide
how best to minimize her own risk in a context where harms and perceptions
of harms vary considerably from person to person. For example, imagine a
daughter is working toward a master’s degree in business or is writing a novel
when her father has a stroke. She might, on one hand, believe that finishing
her degree or the novel is the best way to protect her future security or to
pursue her dreams. Or she might prefer to put these pursuits on hold. More
facially neutral long-term care policies would at least give her the opportunity
for such deliberation.
Furthermore, more flexible policies are sensitive to the complexity of
factors that go into such decisions, balancing the needs of care recipients and
their next friends. In some cases, the care recipient might prefer care by a
friend or family, or family might be better able to address a care-recipient’s
needs.281 Some studies suggest that treatment outcomes can be better when a
loved one provides care.282 In other cases, it might not be best for a family
member to provide care, such as when more specialized care is needed, when
a parent was or is abusive, or when the parent is reticent to burden family or
friends with caregiving but willing to accept paid, professional help. In many
cases, a combination of providing and paying for care might be best. As Carol
Levine, a prominent long-term care scholar and the primary caregiver for
seventeen years for her husband, who was paralyzed from the neck down in a
car accident, aptly describes: “Total self-sacrifice may be ennobled in legend;
280
281
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282
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it is a decidedly unsatisfactory way to live one’s life and a poor basis for
public policy.”283 The point is that there is no single right answer on how to
structure long-term care provision for every circumstance. Policies must be
designed in a way that creates space for this variability.
Simply creating an option to outsource care in more cases would change
the landscape by softening the way that the law currently creates a bias toward
informal caregiving. As Gillian Lester has explained: “[I]f a state intervention
makes a choice previously unavailable to some portion of the population
financially more attractive, the effect will be to encourage individuals on the
margin toward the new option.” 284 We might think of a toggle that creates
facially neutral policies as a “thin version” of state neutrality. The goal would
be to strive for policies that do not, in and of themselves, strongly bias
decisions on how to manage next-friend risk.
Yet a policy that is neutral on its face would not mean neutral grounds
for decisionmaking when layered on top of strong preexisting biases toward
familial care—individual, social, or institutional. A “thick version” of state
neutrality could provide some counterweight to these biases.
For example, individuals might underestimate the burdens of long-term
caregiving and overestimate the benefits.285 People might underestimate the
long-term effect on career advancement or the many sources of income and
assets that will be compromised, including health benefits, social security, or
pensions. They could easily underestimate the length of time care will be
needed; elderly parents suffer diseases that can persist for many years, yet
doctors cannot provide good estimates of likely mortality.286 Likewise, next
friends might suffer from “optimism bias” and overestimate the benefits of
providing care personally, including psychic rewards, possible inheritance, or
even the benefit to the care recipient of family providing care.287 Or the horror
stories about problems that arise in nursing homes might be overly
influential.288
Furthermore, the background social norms and social institutions
discussed in Part II create a non-neutral and self-reinforcing baseline that
could overly determine decisions, especially decisions women make to
provide care directly. The historical reliance on family caregiving has limited
283
284
285
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investment in compelling community-care settings and has atrophied the labor
force for caregiving, which means that even with nimble policies, it may still
seem there is no option but to provide care.
Policies could be designed to be sensitive to and with the aim of
counterbalancing these preexisting biases. 289 At the very least, they could
make transparent the costs and benefits of different choices to prompt people
to consider them.290 Medicaid policies could highlight the benefit of care in
group settings or from formal caregivers, who are often better trained or
equipped to provide care, and the burdens family face when providing care
personally. Even more strongly, the law might, for example, be designed to
discourage untrained next friends from providing care in the hardest cases,
such as with dementia care, where caregivers report the highest burden. 291
Thus, there are compelling reasons to increase social insurance protections for
next friends, but actually doing so is no easy task.
C. Policymaking and Dynamic Effects
Just as current policies compel informal caregiving, new policies would
shape decisions as well, whether intentionally or not. Policymakers try to
predict individual and social responses to policies—dynamic effects—but are
not always able to do so perfectly. And these effects might change in response
to changing social circumstances, requiring iteration over time to achieve
policy goals.
In the case of policies aimed to address next-friend risk, social policy
details could have dramatic effects on workplace participation, the future
development of long-term care facilities and workforce, and kinship
relationships. This Section acknowledges such effects by considering one
especially important policy design question: whether to compensate care a
next friend provides based on lost income or market caregiving wages. This
decision in effect gets to the heart of how exactly we conceive of the insurable
harm—disruption of employment or time spent caregiving—and would have a
significant impact on an individual’s decision to provide or pay for care. This
discussion is not intended to solve this question, which has fueled decades of
feminist debate; rather, I use it to illustrate the importance of policy details.
289
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The first approach, replacing lost income, captures immediate financial
harm in a way familiar to American social insurance, which most often
measures harm as the costs of disruption of paid work. 292 This approach,
however, implies that an at-home parent, a volunteer worker, or an
unemployed worker, who would not experience immediate loss of income, is
not harmed.293 It also takes a snapshot view of harm that does not capture the
cascading effects caregiving might have on someone’s life. If a mother were
caring for her young children but intending to return to work, added
responsibility to care for an aging parent or injured spouse could be the final
straw that prevents her from ever reengaging in paid work.294 Basing benefits
on potential future lost wages would be pure speculation, even if such losses
might have been significant. On the other hand, if a corporate executive took
leave to provide care, social policy would put a high value on the harm, and
the public costs of doing so would be formidable. The fact that the market
values some activities more than others would be felt doubly. Social insurance
policy that views harm only in terms of lost wages would replicate the wage
gap and undervaluation of women’s work.295
This approach would have cascading effects. Lower-paid or unemployed
family members, more likely women, would have less incentive to take on
caregiving, and they would be paid less when they do. And all else equal, a
higher earner could more freely make a decision to provide care with less
financial sacrifice.
This approach would also face practical challenges. Benefits with a
higher dollar value could increase concerns of moral hazard or fraud. Plus, it
would be difficult to administer and finance benefits based on individual lost
wages, especially if a substantial number of higher-earners took on caregiving
roles. Realistically, full wage replacement is infeasible, but partial
replacement is conceivable. As an example, California is one of three states
with a disability program designed to compensate family caregiving by
replacing lost income—the others are Rhode Island and New Jersey. In 2016
in California, which has the most generous of the three programs, the program
reimburses caregivers fifty-five percent of lost earnings, but up to a maximum
of $1129 per week and only for six weeks total.296 Of course, anything less
292

See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 24, at 27. But see Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of
Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the PPACA, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1890-91
(2011) (describing that social insurance can be focused on harms other than disruption of paid
work,
including on harms to health).
293
Cf. Alstott, supra note 141, at 6 (“[O]nce we understand social insurance as the use of law to
address, in a deliberate way, the major risks of life, then the focus of present programs on the
risks
of paid employment begins to seem oddly narrow.”).
294
See, e.g., Skira, supra note 18 (describing the longitudinal effect of informal caregiving for
aging parents on women’s labor participation). Most women who stay home with children later
return to work. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & BARBARA DOWNS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OPTINGOUT: AN EXPLORATION OF LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF NEW MOTHERS 4 (2009) (reporting
that although half of women with children under 12 months are not employed, most are
employed
by the time the child is over 12 months).
295
See supra note 125.
296
State of California Employment Development Department, About Paid Family Leave, at
http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/About_PFL.htm (last accessed September 19, 2016).

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

16:2 (2016)

than full wage replacement relatively reduces incentives to take leave from
work to provide care.
The other approach would be to compensate the hours a next friend
spends caring for another at market caregiving wages. Symbolically, this
approach values hours spent in terms of the service provided instead of in
terms of opportunity costs.
This approach would also have strong dynamic effects. It creates greater
incentives for people with lower or no salary to provide care and for higher
earners not to do so. Benefits would be a job engine for the unemployed or
underemployed. At the same time, this approach would perpetuate the existing
gendered division of care work. Even more, it could actively discourage
women from pursuing work outside of the home, by making home-based work
relatively more attractive than it is now. It would reinforce expectations that
the lower-earning family members (more often women) take on caregiving
and that the higher earners stay in their more lucrative position. Yet, if
benefits are fungible and could be used just as easily to outsource care, the
lower-earning member still gains leverage, as compared to the status quo, to
resist expectations that she be the one to provide the care.
On balance, paying for hours based on market wages, or, even better, a
living wage297 might be preferable. The value of benefits for home-based care
would be the same regardless of whether someone chooses to provide or pay
for the care. Someone would have to value providing care more than her status
quo position (including any wage differential) to take it on personally, or else
she could pay someone else to do it. Higher earners would still have incentive
to outsource, rather than provide care, but the two options would be more
comparable than in today’s world with no compensation for informal
caregiving in most cases. Even if this approach replicates incentives for
people without wage jobs or with lower-paid jobs to take on caregiving, they
would, at the least, receive monetary compensation for work they already do
now without pay. To avoid this replication would require either a thick
version of state neutrality that discourages people from informal caregiving
altogether or policies that address the sources of underlying bias in more
substantial ways.
This example illustrates how the notion of creating neutral policies may
be simple in concept but not in application. The best policymakers can do is to
design the most evenhanded policy possible and monitor and reconsider the
effects of policy decisions over time.
297

The median hourly wage for direct care workers was $10.63 in 2012. America’s Direct-Care
Workforce: November 2013 Update, PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., 2 (2013)
[hereinafter
America’s
Direct-Care
Workforce],
http://phinational.org/sites/phinational.org/files/phi-facts-3.pdf. A full-time job at this wage is
just over $21,000. For criticism of the structure of paid caregiving work, see sources cited supra
note 126.

289

REIMAGINING THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE

D. Considerations for What Counts as Next-Friend Risk
Even those who, in theory, favor social insurance for next-friend risk
might disagree on what exactly should qualify as insurable risk. Some
activities seem routine and others less so. How do we know when an adult
child caring for a parent is at risk as compared to just doing what children do
for their parents? Is it risky simply to be responsible for another’s care or only
when someone lacks the resources to manage such responsibility?
These types of boundary questions undergird all insurance design,
private and social. The answers determine which costs will be shared and
which should remain private obligations.298 For example, the ACA requires
insurers to charge most insured individuals similar premiums, but allows them
to charge smokers higher premiums. 299 Expressively, this policy signals a
belief that smokers have increased their chances of harm and thus should
remain privately responsible for more costs.300 Often the principle of choice is
invoked to justify what is in or out: those costs that result from personal
choices should be private, while stochastic harms should not.301
Line-drawing decisions are inevitably normative and often highly
contested.302 These determinations are high stakes, in part because they serve
to shape how we think about social problems.303 Richard Ericson writes: “In
making risks collective and commodified, insurance alters notions of
providence, responsibility and justice.” 304 For example, Medicare freed
employers from responsibility for retiree health care spending.305 Conversely,
the lack of cohesive state systems for long-term care insurance tacitly affirms
private responsibility. The boundaries of any new approach to insure nextfriend risk will likewise shape how people think about responsibility for longterm care for years to come.
298
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In this Section, I do not attempt to firmly draw these boundaries,
although I suggest that some lines are easier to defend than others. My main
aim is to identify the places where the difficult questions arise and what is at
stake when lines are drawn.
1. Who Bears Next-Friend Risk?
The paradigmatic case of long-term care is that of an adult child caring
for an aging parent, but only about half of cases fit this picture.306 Consider
the following scenarios:
A young girl is diagnosed with autism. She will require significant care
for her entire life. She has two siblings, and both parents work to earn
enough to support the family. (Lifelong-Care Scenario)
A middle-aged man with a wife and no kids has bone-marrow cancer.
His medical care, including chemotherapy and a bone-marrow
transplant, may continue for years. (Midlife-Disruption Scenario)
An elderly widower with two adult children, a daughter and a son, has a
stroke. He had been living independently yet modestly among a
community of close friends. Now he needs help with basic activities, like
showering, voiding, and preparing his food. (Aging Parent Scenario)
It is likely that the parents, the wife, and the daughter (less likely but
possibly the son or a close family friend) will take on responsibility for
caregiving in these cases. They are the next friends, responsible in practice,
even if not required by law, for the long-term care and wellbeing of another.
Are the burdens each faces similar next-friend risks, or is there something
fundamentally different about these situations that warrants treating them
differently?
Above, I offered one definition of risk as a probabilistic harm. To some,
the Aging Parent Scenario might seem more an inevitability. It is more
common that someone would need to care for a parent than for a spouse,
sibling, child, or friend with serious illness and disability.307 One implication
might be that adult children should thus expect and plan for parental care.
Even though more common, about one-half of people never need long-term
care and, among those who need care, the amount of care needed is highly
variable, ranging from very little to years of intensive care.308 Thus, even for
306
307
308
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adult children, it would be difficult to know what level of parental care to
anticipate.
Conversely, some might have an intuition against seeing the Lifelong
Care and Midlife Disruption scenarios as cases of next-friend risk. Perhaps
people take a gamble when they have a child or get married, and the harms
that result are not morally arbitrary. Ronald Dworkin called non-arbitrary
harm the result of “option luck,” as contrasted with “brute luck.” 309 The
principle that justice demands less for harms that result from option luck has
been called “choice-sensitivity.” 310 Kenneth Abraham describes that “the
degree to which a risk is controllable and the degree to which the activity
producing it is socially optional, would form the basis of an egalitarian
standard of fair risk distribution in insurance.”311 Put simply, people should
bear the costs of their own choices.
Someone’s choices can undeniably increase the likelihood of becoming
responsible for someone else. Some people explicitly promise to care for life
partners in sickness, as well as in health. Likewise, most people choose
whether to have children, knowing that raising children is a risky endeavor in
ways that both can and cannot be anticipated. At the most basic level, most of
us know (or should know) that there is some potential for extraordinary levels
of responsibility for another when entering into a relationship. Perhaps
parents, spouses, and friends have assumed the risk of such responsibility
when they enter into relationships, in a way that children, grandchildren, and
siblings have not.312
Yet, these distinctions between those relationships we choose and those
we are born into are shaky. Reasonable people may actually not understand
the extent of responsibility they could bear for another when they marry or
have a child. Most people underestimate the chance that someone they love
will become disabled or ill and need care, especially when it is a distant
possibility.313 Many people assume that their insurance—public or private—
RISK OF REQUIRING LONG-TERM CARE 4, 23-24 (2014), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/wp_2014-12.pdf (summarizing existing research and providing new
estimates that indicate more people will need long-term care than earlier estimates suggest but
of
a shorter average duration).
309
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will cover long-term care, when in most cases it does not.314 Additionally, as
discussed above, the nature of care for a person with a disability is quickly
becoming more medically intensive over time than most people could
imagine. Thus, most people marry or have children with no concept of the
potential responsibility they face if a loved one suffers from chronic illness or
disability.
Assume for a moment, however, that people did fully contemplate this
potential responsibility and still engage voluntarily in relationships. There are
reasons why even in this case it might not make sense for them to fully
internalize the costs. The state often helps people whose choices increase their
risk of harm in order to protect such choices or to promote other important
values. 315 For example, our courts invalidate indemnification clauses in
agreements for participation in sports or dangerous activities 316 and
agreements where patients contract away the right to sue in return for medical
care, 317 when it seems unjust for individuals to bear the costs of harm.
Disaster relief efforts bail out people who built their homes in flood plains, on
earthquake fault lines, or along Tornado Alley because asking them to bear
the costs individually would be devastating.
Social insurance often mitigates harms, even when individual agency
may increase the risk. Medicare covers medical harms for people who are
sicker because they did not care for their bodies in the first sixty-five years of
their life. Social Security does not differentiate between those people who
failed to save and those who succeeded.
François Ewald describes the paradigm of social solidarity underlying
social insurance as “not based on fault but on risk.”318 What he means is that it
is less important to diagnose ex post whether an individual intensified the
possibility of harm she suffers. The more consequential question is whether
we want individuals to bear the full cost of obligations simply because they
derive in part from their own actions. We might in fact not want people to
bear the full costs of extraordinary obligation for loved ones because it could
dissuade kinship relationships. By not requiring people to bear the full cost of
such choices, social insurance protects the activity in which they participate—
in this case getting married or having children.
Even among choice-sensitive egalitarians, there is disagreement about
what should be attributed to choice.319 Individual decisions to partner and to
have children are in most cases voluntary. But in aggregate, they are not.
insurance).
314
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315
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Imagine a society where no one developed long-lasting relationships, or no
one had children. It would be a dismal and short-lived society. When
considered from a collective, rather than individual, perspective, entering into
kinship relationships can be seen as the kind of non-optional social activity
that Abraham contends meets the egalitarian standards for risk spreading,320 or
as deserving because such relationships are something “profoundly good for
society.”321
So far, I have discussed cases where someone increases next-friend risk
simply by engaging in a relationship where she makes it more likely that she
will take responsibility for another’s unpredictable harm. A more extreme but
less common example is when someone acts in a way that increases the
likelihood of someone else becoming ill or disabled. In other words, her
choices increase the risk that someone for whom she is responsible would
need long-term care, not just the risk that she will be responsible for it if it
occurs due to random misfortune. Consider, for example, a pregnant woman
whose actions increase the likelihood she will have a child with birth defects
or a couple who proceeds with a pregnancy after a genetic test confirms that
their baby has Trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome)—a chromosomal abnormality
that results in a child, if born alive, living a short life with intensive caregiving
needs.322
Sometimes insurance carves out these types of situations under the label
of “moral hazard,” and affirms that people should have to pay for such harms
themselves. But even in these more extreme situations such exclusions might
be unjust. With respect to the first example, public health studies show that
certain unhealthy behaviors are shaped strongly by factors outside of an
individual’s control, such as biology, psychology, or social environment. 323
On the second, for some people, continuing a pregnancy to full-term is not a
choice at all. Requiring these individuals to shoulder the full cost of a child
born with a disability would, in the first, compound socioeconomic inequities
and, in the second, force people to choose between their moral beliefs and
their basic security.324
There is no simple, principled definition of which relationships generate
next-friend risk worthy of social insurance protection. Decisions about
whether such relationships are in or out are informed by moral judgment about
320
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when caregiving should remain a private obligation and when it is worthy of
collective support.
2.

Distinguishing Risk from Routine

A second challenge is to identify what responsibilities signal that
someone has experienced next-friend risk. This question demands
reevaluation of what we expect from individuals and what exceeds
expectations. All relationships come with responsibility. In some cases,
obligations seem more routine and in others, extraordinary. For example, a
daughter who grocery shops for her father and checks in on him briefly a few
times a week might ensure his wellbeing with little effort. Most people would
see this level of engagement as routine. Yet, if he needs eight hours of care a
day and that care includes help with feeding and bathing and going to the
bathroom, it seems less routine. Feeding children, bathing them, and getting
them to bed are routine parts of the day for many people. Yet, around-theclock care for a child with a serious disability or feeding, bathing, and
transferring a fifty-year-old spouse into a bed are of a different nature.
What is difficult is where to draw the line between these two extremes.
Some people have children who are easy to care for, and others have children
who, for any number of reasons, require a much greater investment of time,
energy, and, perhaps, angst. Relationships ebb and flow in what they demand
from people. There is no clear line between routine and extraordinary
responsibility.
One starting point would be to define next-friend risk by the triggering
event. Next-friend risk is realized only when the care recipient has suffered
from substantial illness or injury or has a disability that requires prolonged,
intensive care. Benefits could be defined based on the disability, injury, or
illness that triggered a need for care. This categorical approach is, admittedly,
imprecise. A mother might engage in the exact same activities for a child
without a disability as she would for one with a disability and have those
activities be insurable only in the latter case. It also does not recognize the
way that chronic disease evolves. 325 This approach trades off nuance for
administrability and, because of the latter advantage, is often the standard
used in long-term care insurance benefit determinations in countries that
insure long-term care.326
Alternatively, next-friend risk could be defined in a more bottom-up
way, based on the number of hours a next-friend spends in “qualifying” long325
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term care activities, such as helping with Activities of Daily Living. This
approach is more difficult administratively, but provides a more accurate way
to capture the real levels of obligation. Policies could set a baseline of care
that someone would have to provide before being considered at risk—a
deductible paid in dollars or hours before indemnification begins. A welldesigned deductible would reduce concerns of moral hazard and reveal who
are devoted next friends, because someone would have to show a level of
commitment before being able to qualify for benefits.327
Defining when someone has experienced next-friend risk thus requires
both determining what type of activity and what extent of activity qualifies, as
well as what share, if any, should remain private obligation. Definitions that
include more activities shift more responsibility away from an individual and
to the collective. Conversely, carving out more activities preserves private
obligation. Any method for making such decisions involves tradeoffs between
precision and administrability and some arbitrariness.
3.

Does Financial Status Quo Matter?

Should risk of harm be contingent on financial status quo? In other
words, is the risk of harm merely that a next friend has to use resources,
measured in time or money, to support another’s long-term care, or does risk
arise only when she has to use resources that she does not have to spare?
For example, in the Aging Parent Scenario, if the daughter is wealthy,
she might pay for professional care without risking her family’s financial
security.328 The same is true for the parents of the daughter with autism in the
Lifelong Care Scenario. Perhaps they do not experience next-friend risk if
they can easily afford to enroll her in a special school and to create a trust
fund for her care after they die. Using state funds to support care in these
cases might be unnecessary or undesirable.
Yet, a means-based definition of risk does not capture the many ways
that responsibility for another can pose burdens. Even if a next friend is
wealthy, if she takes on responsibility for another, she will experience costs,
both financial and nonmonetary. Requiring her to deplete her own savings
reinforces a system where private obligation is primary and the state’s role is
secondary. 329 Making eligibility contingent on wealth also devalues the
nonmonetary costs she faces.
Attempts to define risk based on a next friend’s wealth may also be
futile. As noted above, few people have the resources necessary to pay for any
327

It might also lead to a consolidation of care because, with multiple caregivers, it is possible
that
no one would exceed the deductible.
328
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prolonged period of long-term care—one reason why most next friends
provide it in kind. Trying to isolate the few who do have such resources would
require significant administrative effort with little payoff. Furthermore, if care
recipients can choose any next friend, they could just designate a poor family
member. Means tests would dissuade people who are in more stable
circumstances from taking on the role of next friend if they cannot claim state
support but a sibling or friend in a more precarious position could. The end
result might be suboptimal care arrangements.
Defining risk as contingent on a next friend’s financial resources would
replicate current inequities in financing for long-term care. Poor next friends,
who qualify for benefits, could use the benefits to choose to arrange for or to
provide care. Wealthy next friends would self insure and have the same
choice. But middle-income next friends would neither qualify for benefits nor
have money to pay for care, leaving them in the same position many are in
today: providing care because no other option is available.
Another approach, in a classic model of social insurance, defines harm
based on an ex ante, population-based view. Not knowing what any one
individual’s lot in life will be, social insurance is designed to protect everyone
from “common economic risks in a changing world.”330 Those who end up
less in need of such protections because of a good lot in life are not expunged
from the program ex post. For example, Medicare pays for medical care for
nearly all Americans over age sixty-five, regardless of wealth level, protecting
against harm from poor health in retirement. Likewise, Social Security pays
benefits to all eligible retirees, regardless of private savings.
A universal approach would, in effect, define next-friend risk simply as
taking responsibility for the long-term care of another. Avoiding categorical
inquiry would have all of the benefits that accrue to other universal social
insurance programs. Social Security and Medicare—the two social insurance
programs with near universal contribution and benefits—endure as among the
most popular U.S. government programs.331 As expressed in a recent book on
social insurance: “Covering most people at risk and treating everyone equally
as risk bearers increases the sense of social insurance’s fairness.”332 Nearly
eighty percent of Americans think these programs have benefitted the United
States and a majority would not reduce current benefit levels to reduce the
deficit or taxes.333
Means-testing, in contrast, is solidarity-diminishing because it draws a
line between the haves, who are self-sufficient, and the have-nots, who are
330
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not.334 Creating universal benefits can avoid such stratification. As one expert
describes, it enhances the “pedigree of cultural respectability” of a program by
not requiring “questions about morally freighted matters such as family
income and assets, household composition, or individual work effort.”335
Yet, a universal approach can redistribute resources from categories of
people who are low risk to those who are high risk in a way that will, in some
cases, be regressive. For example, if people with no siblings are at higher risk
of caring for a parent and also more likely to be higher income, they might be
subsidized by people who are on average lower income. Regressivity can be
lessened by progressive financing. If the higher-income child contributed to
the program more through higher tax rates throughout her lifetime, she could
draw benefits without necessarily being subsidized by lower-income others.336
Social Security and Medicare are both structured in this way.
A separate question is whether next-friend risk can exist at all when the
care recipient has financial resources to pay for care.337 When a person with a
disability or illness can finance his own care, his family member, in theory,
faces less responsibility. For example, if the father in the Parent Scenario were
wealthy, he could pay for someone to provide his care. Or he could ask his
daughter to provide the care and compensate her.338 This issue highlights the
relational aspect of long-term care risk. Social insurance benefits for the
daughter of a wealthy man might effectively serve to preserve her inheritance.
Some might gauge use of collective resources in this way as less just or lower
priority. Others might see her inheritance as part of what she has to lose from
next-friend risk.
These difficult boundary questions are a core part of any social insurance
design. It is necessary first to quantify a harm someone has experienced and
then, second, to decide who should pay that price.
E. Objections to Insuring Next-Friend Risk
Any expansion of social insurance is highly contested—an
understatement in light of the fact that, years after its passage, the ACA
remains under constant attack.339 The standard objections involve questioning
the proper role of the state, administrability, and affordability. Policies where
family members can be paid for caregiving trigger heightened moral hazard
and fraud objections—objections that have the rhetorical power to stop
334
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policies in their tracks. Each of these concerns, discussed in turn herein, can
inform better policy design, but none is good reason to choose not to better
insure next-friend risk.
An increased state role in long-term care can threaten the strong tradition
and social norms of family care. The state’s entry into this domestic sphere
sparks concerns of commodification of family caregiving, which could mean a
number of different things. 340 Sometimes, commodification objections are
mere pretext for preserving the current, gendered system of caregiving or are a
thinly veiled way of suggesting that care work is not something public
resources should compensate. That is the very view this Article aims to
challenge. A more complex version of a commodification critique is that
paying for family care would diminish its value because of the “corrosive
tendency of markets.” 341 This view is well-intentioned, motivated by the
desire to protect goodness in the connection between loved ones. Yet it is
based on a fallacy that caregiving and economic activity exist independently.
Caregiving has long had an implicit and explicit price, both within and outside
of the family structure.342 In other words, the worlds of money and love are
already deeply blurred.
There are, however, some aspects of what family and friends and, also,
paid caregivers provide that could never be priced in dollar terms. 343 But
paying for the aspects that can be valued—the heavy lifting of long-term care,
so to speak—need not diminish or crowd out the intimate aspects of care. In
fact, empirically it does not. Studies show exactly the opposite: even paid
caregivers show great affection for the people for whom they care. 344
Furthermore, even when families hire paid caregivers, family members
continue to spend significant time caring but focus instead on the tasks that
they are better suited than a formal caregiver at doing.345
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A related critique is that state involvement requires an invasion of
private, family space. It is true that the availability of benefits requires the
state to determine eligibility, and the receipt of money necessarily invites
monitoring. A universal social insurance program with categorical benefits
would minimize the invasiveness of both efforts. Some research suggests that
even informal caregivers who face significant burden are skeptical of state
involvement, but this study also shows that the availability of social insurance
relief can shift both their roles and their perspectives.346 In other words, the
privacy concerns seem less acute when a family caregiver experiences the
benefits of state support.
Another objection to any expansion of social insurance is that it will
crowd out private insurance solutions or private savings, which studies
confirm does occur to some degree.347 The obvious response in the case of
next-friend risk is that even without public insurance, private insurance
solutions have failed. The level of private savings that a next friend would
need to have to effectively self-insure is impossible for nearly everyone, even
if they saved aggressively. Furthermore, this concern presumes that private
insurance or saving is the best first option and that state responsibility should
only be a last resort—the very assumption this Article challenges.
That all said, private insurance options could be developed over time and
integrated with public solutions to the degree desired. In fact, if private
insurance policies were marketed to next friends to mitigate the risk they face,
it might prove more saleable. Some of the bias that thwarts people from
buying long-term care policies for themselves might not deter children from
insuring against the risk of caring for their parents or future parents from
insuring against the risk of a child with a disability. And, according to one
study, if private policies included benefits to pay family members for care,
there would be greater purchase of them by people who now opt out because
they prefer family care over formal care.348 Social insurance policies could
continue to include incentives for the purchase of private long-term care
policies, as in the long-term care partnerships.349
Moral hazard and fraud are simultaneously sources of genuine concern
and red herrings. As Jonathan Simon has written, “The perception that fraud is
rampant in welfare and social insurance systems has helped to de-legitimize
broad, entitlement-based risk spreading programs. Indeed . . . moral hazard
346
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has become a block on any substantial expansion of social insurance in recent
decades.”350 Moral hazard is the idea that when people are insured, they have
reduced incentive to avoid losses. Moral hazard can be an ex ante failure to
prevent losses (i.e., carelessness when insured) or an ex post failure to
mitigate losses as inexpensively as possible (i.e., malingering). 351 Ex ante
moral hazard—the idea that people will fail to prevent harm—is inapt in this
context. The risk of harm is only triggered by the disability or illness of a
loved one, circumstances that people avoid for independent reasons, even if
insured. The more pertinent concern is that social insurance will lead to
overuse of benefits. In other words, the number of people living with and
caring for someone else will skyrocket in response to the availability of
insurance benefits.
This so-called woodwork effect might capture two different things. It
might simply mean that more people are getting the necessary care that they
were not before. Meeting unmet demand in this way is what Deborah Stone
has called a “moral opportunity” and is the very purpose of social welfare
programs.352 It could also mean that people are exaggerating a need for care, if
someone could get by on her own but will take help if a family member can
get cash benefits to provide the assistance. This possibility is harder to avoid,
but can be lessened through well-designed criteria for eligibility based on a
disability determination. Other countries with social insurance for long-term
care have developed systems where case workers or medical professionals
measure and categorize levels of disability, which have worked reasonably
well.353
Avoiding moral hazard informs the design of any social insurance
program. As Anne Alstott has written, “Moral hazard permeates every form of
insurance, and . . . there are a host of tools for managing it, including
copayments, categorical eligibility, delayed benefits, limited benefits, selffinancing, and so on.”354 With respect to long-term care, a deductible could
reduce moral hazard. As suggested above, policies could set a number of
hours of care that someone would have to provide or arrange and pay for
before she would qualify for benefits. Even if it is a real concern, empirical
evidence of long-term care social insurance that pays family members cash
benefits suggests that such concerns may be overstated.355
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Fraud may be a more challenging problem. People might misrepresent
disability if they can get cash benefits for family. Or next friends might claim
benefits and not provide care. Fraud enforcement with personal care services
is particularly difficult because the services are diffuse in individual homes
and hard to monitor. The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services has already made a special effort to detect fraud
in home-based personal care services under Medicaid.356 Medical eligibility
determinations can be used to root out false claims. And high penalties for
fraudulent claims can be used as a deterrent. Even though there would
undoubtedly be some problems with fraud, evaluation of demonstration
projects, where benefits can be used to pay family for care, have also found
surprisingly few cases of fraudulent use of the benefits.357
Concerns about quality of care when provided by family or friends is a
particularly American preoccupation. Other countries with long-term care
policies that offer cash benefits for family to provide care believe that, in
general, people are likely to get better care from family than from formal
caregivers.358 Results from the Cash and Counseling Demonstration project in
the United States revealed fewer cases of abuse and neglect and fewer unmet
needs among beneficiaries who used a cash benefit compared to control group
members.359 There would of course be some problems with poor quality care
at the hands of friends or family, but it may prove no worse—and possibly
better—than in formal care settings. Further, these next friends are many of
the same people providing unpaid care today. Compensating them for their
work would be unlikely to reduce the quality of their caregiving.
Finally, any comprehensive solution would be very expensive—a fact
which undoubtedly influences many scholars’ pragmatic focus on piecemeal
solutions. Total paid long-term care was just over $220 billion in 2011,
excluding Medicare post-acute care. 360 The aforementioned estimate of
replacement cost of family caregiving is $470 billion, which would triple
current spending, and is only a partial account of long-term care since it only
considers care for adults.361 This increased cost is a genuine hurdle.
Current policy, however, has simply obscured the fact that individuals
shoulder those costs privately, as an invisible copayment, and has enabled
political inaction. The United States spends relatively less on long-term care
than other developed countries do, even as it spends more on nearly every
other category of health care. 362 Accounting for next-friend risk makes it
356
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harder to continue down this path. If the Congressional Budget Office were to
include the over half-trillion dollars in care provided by informal caregivers as
a cost of current policies, it would hamstring these policies that are biased
toward informal caregiving. 363 Legal myopia has saved the government an
estimated half-trillion dollars a year in direct costs. These costs are not
avoided. They are simply borne off budget and disproportionately by people
less able to bear them.
***
In sum, the real costs of our current system and the insecurity and
inequities it generates demand recognizing next-friend risk and considering it
on par with care-recipient risk. In part, social policies have prioritized carerecipient risk because of the immediacy of the need, the vulnerability of the
recipients, and the dire consequences of failing to meet their needs. But nextfriend risk is creating deep and long-lasting harm. This harm is easier to
ignore but no less important of a target for social policy. Although we should
not neglect the short-term needs of the disabled and sick, we should no more
neglect the wellbeing and security of their next friends.
Any major social problem seems too big to solve until society
recognizes that the costs of not solving it are also untenable. Many other
countries—including Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands, as discussed
below—have overcome objections and created universal long-term care social
insurance systems. These systems are expensive, and these countries certainly
revisit the costs on a regular basis. Yet, they each (and others as well) have
decided that long-term care is an important social priority and worth an
investment of social resources.
IV.

A BRIEF SKETCH OF POLICY OPTIONS

The primary goal of this Article is to introduce the concept of next-friend
risk and to make the case for considering it as a social policy priority. I leave
for later the development of policy details. Nonetheless, this Part offers a brief
sketch of several different possible approaches to illustrate how policies—
both comprehensive and incremental—can be designed in ways more
sensitive to next-friend risk.
One primary goal would be to create financing and institutional
structures for long-term care that enable a smoother toggle between paying for
care and providing care, as described above. Policies must have a toggle in
363
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structure and support processes and institutions that empower next friends to
actually choose between options. Section IV.A illustrates how a
comprehensive social insurance program could better mitigate next-friend
risk. Yet, incremental changes that build on existing social welfare programs
could also make a significant difference, as discussed in Section IV.B.
A. Envisioning Next-Friend Social Insurance
1.

The Basic Concept

A universal long-term care social insurance program could be designed
with the explicit goal of mitigating both next-friend and care-recipient risk.
The specific contours could take many forms. The basic idea would be that
someone who has a qualifying disability would designate a next-friend, who
would then receive benefits that could be used to pay for or provide care. It
could be designed to supplement what Medicaid does now for care recipients
or to replace it entirely. It could be created from the ground up or expand the
scope and size of existing programs that are sensitive to next-friend risk, such
as the Veterans Administration family caregiving program or Cash and
Counseling participant-directed programs, discussed below. Others have
offered proposals for universal long-term care insurance.364 Here, I consider
specifically what elements such social insurance would need to include to be
sensitive to next-friend risk and how it might differ from policies that focus
narrowly on care-recipient risk.
Eligibility would be based on both the care recipient and next friend. The
first step would be determination of qualifying disability or illness, based on a
care recipient’s condition, as with Medicaid and Medicare post-acute care
now. A second step would be to identify an eligible next friend, which could
be based on whom a care-recipient or her legal guardian chooses. Eligibility
rules could categorically limit next friends to close relatives, as the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) does for its guarantee of twelve
364
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weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for family care.365 But a more flexible
definition would better reflect the existing picture of informal care, as an
African saying recognizes: “The one you are left with is your relation.” 366
Program rules might limit the caregiving any one individual can be paid to do
or the number of people for whom she could be paid to coordinate in-kind
benefits.
The process of having to designate a next friend offers the collateral
benefit of prompting more transparent and deliberate decisions about longterm care. Naming a next friend would make clear who is responsible for
helping a care recipient with care management decisions, akin to naming a
health care proxy. If benefits were vested in or controlled in part by the next
friend, it could encourage a care recipient to initiate explicit conversations
about what kind of care he wants with his next friend, before the next friend
helps him to operationalize his care.
Any individual who does not want to provide care would have greater
ability to opt out. The universality of benefits, and the ability to use them
interchangeably to pay for in-kind care, would bolster her bargaining
power.367 Imagine that a mother asks her daughter to care for her in her old
age. Without next-friend insurance, she may feel as if she has few options.
With it, in contrast, she could accept responsibility and provide care and get
paid to do so. She could accept responsibility and hire someone else to
provide some or all of the care, using benefits for this in-kind assistance. Or
she could decline and suggest another family member or friend instead. Such
conversations would undoubtedly still be shaped by family dynamics. But the
goal would be for the structure of benefits to create a more neutral baseline for
conversation and for real deliberation. As in other countries’ social insurance
programs for long-term care, case managers could explain options, mediate
disputes that arise, and monitor quality on an ongoing basis.368
A critique of an approach that empowers next friends in the decision
process is that it erodes the autonomy that independent living movement
advocates have long worked to wrest back for care recipients, by requiring
them to name a next friend who has some control over how benefits are
used.369 Care recipients, however, would retain the ultimate control through
the ability to designate the next friend.370
365
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More importantly, the reality is that many people rely on family to help
meet their long-term care needs now, and recognizing these caregiving dyads
more formally in the law would be beneficial. For example, it could address
problems in the Medicaid consumer-directed demonstration programs, in
which care recipients can hire and fire their own provider. One criticism of
these programs is that they turn care recipients into employers and put them in
a position where they might mismanage their personal budgets. 371 The
responsibility can be burdensome: “only a fraction of individuals with
disabilities have the time, inclination, and skills to search for, hire, and train
their own personal assistants. . . . Many people, disabled and nondisabled . . .
find that the burdens of becoming an employer are great.” 372 Plus, these
programs have eroded caregivers’ job benefits and labor protections because
they treat each care recipient as an individual employer.373 Taking the care
recipient out of the middle so that the state directly pays the next friend or
formal caregiver, once selected, avoids these problems. It may be that care
recipients find that the ability to influence their care, without having to
manage it or to become an employer, is even more autonomy enhancing.
Next-friend insurance could professionalize long-term care services, by
more formally recognizing the work friends and family do and creating a
structure for formal labor protections and job benefits. The Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) family caregiver program offers a model. It
compensates family caregivers at higher rates than other programs and also
addresses sources of nonmonetary harm. 374 Family caregivers of seriously
injured post-9/11 veterans can receive health insurance, mental health
services, comprehensive training by Easter Seals, respite care of thirty days or
more a year, and reimbursement for travel expenses when accompanying the
veteran for care.375 These types of protections would benefit all informal and
formal caregivers.
The point here is not to flesh out the full details of a new social insurance
benefit but rather to highlight the most critical elements. Next friends would
be formally appointed and have a voice in decisions. They would be treated as
workers, if they provide care, or compensated for their time as case managers
if they help to arrange care. The goals of such policies would be two-fold: to
get people needed long-term care, and to enable their friends and family to
help them do so without taking on excessive risk themselves.

his own care by designating a formal care provider to serve as the next friend. Letting someone
choose to bypass friends and family altogether would still serve the ends of protecting friends
and family from next-friend risk, while also meeting a care-recipient’s needs and honoring his
autonomy.
371
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372
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373
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Models for Next-Friend Social Insurance

The idea of creating a social insurance program explicitly intending to
benefit next friends might seem utopian, but there are already elements of this
type of approach in practice in various small-scale programs, including the
VA program, the consumer-directed Medicaid programs, and in the state paid
leave programs in California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, which offer
benefits to pay for time spent caregiving for family or friends.376 Next-friend
social insurance could build on these types of efforts.
It could also be based on the models of universal long-term care social
insurance implemented in other countries. At the very least, the different
models chosen elsewhere provide a window into policy design that is more or
less sensitive to next-friend risk.
Lessons from long-term care social insurance in Japan, the Netherlands,
and Germany illustrate how long-term care policy can be designed in ways
more or less sensitive to next-friend risk. The long-term care policies in these
three countries share many characteristics: they are all non-means tested,
universal social insurance programs funded primarily by payroll taxes (and
secondarily by premiums in Japan and copayments in Germany).377 The Dutch
and German programs are for beneficiaries of all ages,378 while the Japanese
program is for older beneficiaries.379 They all give beneficiaries some level of
control over benefits. Yet, each has had very different results.
The Japanese program strongly discourages family care with the goal of
displacing the tradition of reliance on daughters-in-law for elder care.380 The
program was developed to address social changes similar to those in the
United States that made this reliance unsustainable: fewer people are living
with their children; an increased number of women are working; and people
are more willing to accept outside help.381 This program only pays for in-kind
care; cash allowances were fought by feminists who wanted dollars to be used
to grow labor supply to meet demand and to liberate daughters-in-law.382 They
believed that an option for cash benefits would reinforce oppressive
caregiving patterns. Japan’s policy design could serve as a model of a strong
376
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counterbalance to existing family care biases—a thick version of neutral
policy. In effect, the choice is between paid in-kind care and unpaid informal
care, putting a heavy thumb on the scale for formal care but still allowing
someone who strongly values providing care (or with an insistent family
member) to do so without pay.
The Dutch and German systems are more similar in design, although
different in result. The Dutch program illustrates a relatively flexible toggle
that has resulted in ninety percent of beneficiaries choosing in-kind homecare. 383 People can choose between in-kind services or a cash “personal
budget” worth seventy-five percent of the value of the in-kind benefit (the
discount is explained as due to the higher administrative costs of agencybased care but creates a bias toward in-kind care).384 For people who choose
cash, at least ninety percent of the personal budget must be spent on human
assistance, paying anyone the “budget holder” chooses, including friends or
family.385 The cash benefits are relatively more valuable than in Germany, yet
most Dutch claimants still choose in-kind care.386
Germany’s program, in contrast to both the Japanese and Dutch systems,
has reinforced reliance on informal caregivers. In 1994, Germany created a
compulsory, universal social insurance that is available to people with more
severe disabilities (defined as in need of assistance with at least two Activities
of Daily Living).387 Like the Dutch system, it has a toggle between in-kind
services and cash benefits, but the cash benefits have a face value of only 50%
of the in-kind benefit.388 Despite this significant discount, 80 percent of home
care beneficiaries and half of all beneficiaries, including those in nursing
homes, have chosen the cash benefit and continue to rely on informal
caregivers. 389
Some of the variability in results may be due to different underlying
social expectations or institutions but likely not all. All three countries have
long histories of reliance on family for long-term care. The rates of
employment of women in the Netherlands is especially low, which, in theory,
would make the opportunity costs of providing informal care lower than in
Germany; yet more people choose in-kind care.390
Several elements of the design of the German program have been
identified as perpetuating reliance on informal caregivers. The most important
is that the cash benefit can be used in any way desired and is vested in the care
recipient, not the caregiver; in other words, the care recipient is given cash
that the government does not require be spent on human assistance, as in the
Dutch program. Experts speculate that high unemployment led some
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
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beneficiaries to opt for cash benefits but then to continue to rely on unpaid
informal care.391
In addition, the cash benefits, when paid to a family member, are not
counted as income for tax purposes. 392 And although like in the Dutch
program, the German family workers are not formally on the state payroll and
have no formal worker protections, the German government does pay into
pension, health insurance, and unemployment funds for any family caregiver
who provides more than fourteen hours of care per week.393 These benefits
plus tax-free income might make caregiving relatively more attractive than
other paid work.
Experts surmise the German program was intentionally designed to bias
family care, which had been declining as families became smaller and
geographically dispersed. 394 Consistent with conservative German “familyfirst” notions, one expert describes that these policies “enabl[ed] women to
withdraw from the workforce.” 395 The program has thus institutionalized
reliance on family care, reinforced gender roles, and not contributed to the
growth of the formal labor force for caregiving. Although the German
program has a policy toggle in structure, it does not operate fluidly in practice
and is likely not intended to do so.
B. Incremental Reforms
A new social insurance program is not necessary, however, to better
mitigate next-friend risk. Especially in the short term, it is possible to build on
current policies and demonstration projects to scale them and to make them
more sensitive to next-friend risk. Some approaches would require additional
funding; others might not.
1.

Filling in Medicaid’s Gaps

One possibility is to fill in Medicaid’s gaps so that at least those care
recipients who are eligible for Medicaid might rely less on next friends. One
monumental, but potentially expensive, step would be to loosen financial
eligibility criteria for long-term care benefits.396 Doing so would increase the
number of Medicaid eligible care recipients and enhance the impact of
reforms that build on Medicaid as a foundation.397
391
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Another incremental step would be to require states to cover more
personal care services—such as assistance with bathing, feeding, transferring,
or toileting—for the existing beneficiaries who receive long-term care at
home, instead of in an institutional setting. As described in Part II, many states
do not have personal care services programs for adults at all,398 or pay for a
very limited quantity.399 Changing these benefits from optional to mandatory
in the standard state programs and requiring waiver programs to cover them at
sufficient levels would prevent states from shifting long-term care into home
settings but then failing to cover needed care. The lack of funding for these
services in home settings not only burdens next friends, it also limits choices.
When family and friends can fill in the gaps, home care remains a viable
option. For others, nursing home care might be the only choice. Thus, even
just increasing funding for these services could meaningfully alleviate burdens
and stress for next friends, while also preserving options for care recipients
(even if it left largely unaltered the current structure of long-term care).
2.

Expanding and Designing Policy Toggles in Medicaid ConsumerDirected Care Programs

A more ambitious approach is to adapt, invest in, and build out nascent
programs that allow benefits to be used more flexibly. A major trend in longterm care financing is consumer-directed programs that allow beneficiaries the
ability to hire, train, supervise, and fire their home-care workers. Many of
these programs are designed with a toggle, where the beneficiary can choose
either in-kind benefits (formal caregivers or a nursing home) or use a cash
benefit to pay a family member or friend for care.
These “participant directed” programs have gained popularity following
a successful demonstration called Cash and Counseling, initiated in the mid1990s by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.400 Six percent of Medicaid
long-term care beneficiaries are now in a participant-directed program.401 The
terms of these programs vary considerably state-by-state on important
dimensions. For example, the majority of the programs restrict hiring a legally
responsible individual (e.g., a spouse, parent, or legal guardian), which can
create a bias toward hiring a formal caregiver.402 These programs will likely
continue to grow as a share of Medicaid long-term care funding and can be
designed to be more sensitive to next-friend risk if doing so were a core goal.
they would likely be challenged as beyond Congress’ authority. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
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398
Medicaid Benefits: Personal Care Services, supra note 115.
399
NG. ET AL., supra note 94, at 12-14.
400
See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 357.
401
Facts and Figures: 2013 National Inventory Survey on Participant Direction, NAT’L RES.
CTR.
FOR
PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED
SERVS
5
fig.2
(2014),
https://nrcpds.bc.edu/downloadfile.php?filename=1411162479_NRCPDS_Facts_Figures_Final.
pdf. Six percent includes over thirty percent of beneficiaries in California, which skews the
national
average. Id.
402
Id. at 11 (reporting that 11% of responding programs indicated that a spouse, parent, or legal
guardian could be paid as a caregiver).

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

16:2 (2016)

An example of how even just one design element could create bias in
how benefits are used is illustrated by the In-Home Supportive Services
(IHSS) program in California. This Medicaid program is the largest program
in the United States with a toggle that, in design, allows benefits to pay formal
caregivers or close family members. 403 Two-thirds of IHSS recipients receive
care from a relative, and in about half of these cases, they live in the same
home. 404 To qualify for IHSS funding, as well as Supplemental Security
Income cash benefits for the person with a disability, household income must
be extremely low. 405 In calculating household income, these programs
disregard IHSS benefits paid to a family caregiver.406 This means the money
paid to a wife to care for her husband would not disqualify him from receiving
benefits, but wages from her work in a job outside the home likely would. The
policy creates a strong incentive for her to provide care directly, rather than
keep her job and hire someone to provide the care, even if doing so leaves her
insecure in the long run. Treating her IHSS income or outside income the
same—either counting both or neither—is necessary to enable the toggle to
work.
As participant-directed care grows in the United States, an approach
sensitive to next-friend risk would consider how policies should be designed
to avoid reinforcing a strong bias toward family care, as in Germany or
California. The goal should be, at the very least, policies that aim for a thin
version of neutrality.
3.

Investments in Infrastructure

Investment in community-based care infrastructure and a formal labor
force could enhance options in the gap between nursing home and homebased care. New models show that high-quality care can be provided in
community settings, but these existing models exist as isolated experiments
and mostly focus on elder care.407
One of the first programs, which combines health and personal care
needs is called On Lok and was started as a health plan in San Francisco in
403
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1971 to help an aging Asian population age at home.408 On Lok inspired a
Medicare demonstration program known as the Program for All-Inclusive
Care for the Elderly (PACE). 409 The most intriguing part of the model is the
On Lok Lifeways Centers, which they call the “hub” of the program, where
participants go from one to five days a week for medical care, adult day care,
and social activities, including exercise and meals.410 The model has targeted
low-income and frail elderly. 411 Participants who are eligible for Medicare,
Medicaid, and SSI pay nothing out of pocket; others pay a monthly fee.412 For
example, people eligible only for Medicare can “top off” Medicare benefits,
which enables middle-income families to afford these programs and increases
funds available for investment in the programs’ growth. On Lok program
evaluations show high participant satisfaction, improved health and physical
functioning, improved quality of life, and lower mortality. 413 At the same
time, they free up informal caregivers for all or part of the work week.
A newer private-sector experiment is the Green House movement.
Started by a doctor who wanted a better way to care for frail elderly than in
nursing homes and with seed funding by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Green House intends to be a “homelike” community-based care
setting. 414 People live in a private room with a bathroom in a small,
technology-equipped home for eight to ten residents. They eat communally.
Green House accepts both Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement. As of the
end of 2014, 167 Green Houses had over 1700 people living in them, and 108
new homes were in development. 415 They have had particular success
recruiting and retaining caregivers, whom they call “shahbazim” and pay ten
percent more than certified nursing assistants. Green House can afford higher
salaries because of extremely low turnover and the shahbazims’ responsibility
for a broad range of activities, from personal care to cooking to
housekeeping.416
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Early research on Green House also indicates positive outcomes. 417
Anecdotal evidence in a recent New York Times article describes one older
woman who “needed help eating and rarely spoke” but within a day of
moving into a Green House, fed herself and sang Amazing Grace.418 Even if
not all residents are so dramatically altered, this program creates smallerscale, community-based care options for families who are reticent to “put
mom in a nursing home.”
An obvious challenge is scaling such models in a way that they retain
their quality and remain affordable for more than just the wealthiest families.
One intriguing aspect of Green Houses is that community members have
donated land and professional services to build facilities, lowering fixed
costs.419 For lower-income residents, On Lok received Department of Housing
and Urban Development funds for its residential facilities. The ability to
combine public and private funds in both programs creates growth opportunity
and access for more people. Yet, even with many of these elements in place,
programs have not scaled well.420 If we understand these kinds of programs as
necessary to mitigating next-friend risk, learning how to scale them should be
higher priority.
One of the greatest infrastructure challenges is the caregiver labor
shortage. By one estimate, 3.5 million additional health providers, including
nearly 1.6 million registered nurses and nursing aides, will be needed by 2030
just to maintain already insufficient provider-to-population ratios.421 Meeting
the needs of the elderly will be especially hard because of a gap in geriatric
care training.422
Higher wages are needed to spur labor growth.423 That said, higher wages
on their own might be insufficient. As one scholar bluntly recognizes:
“Helping people to dress, eat, urinate, and defecate simply is not an attractive
career. Dealing with individuals in various stages of dementia is trying.”424 He
adds that the lack of respect, little room for advancement, and stress of these
jobs is not easily defrayed with money.425 Efforts to overcome the aspects that
could be improved are thus even more critical; without high-quality options,
many people will be unwilling to outsource care.
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4.

Reshaping the Social and Institutional Baseline

Finally, addressing the many ways that existing legal and social norms
and institutions bias care choices is beyond the scope of this article but
nonetheless important for policy development. As one example, FMLA jobleave protections may be insufficient to support efforts to balance caregiving
and paid work.426
FMLA leave is limited to caregiving for a spouse, child, or parent,
leaving out the many people who care for grandparents, siblings, aunts and
uncles, or close friends. 427 Furthermore, some of its terms have been
interpreted to exclude activities common in long-term caregiving. 428 For
example, the term “provide care” has been interpreted to exclude time spent
moving a parent into a new living arrangement that better met her health
needs.429 The complexity of FMLA makes it difficult for people to understand
what is covered.430 Finally, twelve weeks of leave may be too short in many
cases, considering that the average period of informal care lasts 4.6 years.431 It
is unrealistic to expect employers to hold jobs open for years, and this
expectation would also be unproductive since such mandates can shift costs to
workers. However, something more than twelve weeks is needed in some
situations.432 The point is that there are many ways we could address these
broader legal or social factors that exacerbate next-friend risk.
CONCLUSION
Taking next-friend risk seriously fundamentally shifts what it means to
solve the long-term care crisis. It is not just a crisis faced by people who suffer
from prolonged illness or disability. It is equally a crisis for their children,
parents, siblings, grandchildren, aunts and uncles, and closest friends, who
sacrifice their own wellbeing to care for them. They are interrupting their
careers, their relationships, and their life pursuits. These next friends are
invisibly bearing the costs of caring and experiencing disquieting insecurity in
their own lives.
By seeing these costs as evidence of an insurable risk and pursing
policies that are more sensitive to this risk, we can create a society in which
some people, especially women, no longer experience severe harms due to the
tragic misfortune of having a loved one become ill or disabled. Better long426
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term care policy, defined as policy that aims equally to mitigate next-friend
risk, can solve a problem that is perpetuating deep social inequities and can
provide greater security for all families.
Reimagining risk is an exercise with import beyond long-term care. Most
social insurance programs and many regulations are based on implicit
definitions of the risks that are worthiest of collective attention. By illustrating
one field in which a narrow definition of risk has created an unstable
foundation for policy-making, this article invites further examination of the
law’s role in inscribing obligation for some and security for others by how it
imagines risk.
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